Barry, it is a truism that a WG publication request implies consensus of
the workgroup.  But I expect the Last Call to consider the question of
whether the workgroup addressed an important public good and solved it.
 Your document says that you have not.

Within the WG, the public good which had the greatest interest was a
solution to the mailing list problem.   Since evaluators are blocking the
affected mailing list traffic, the solution requires a change in evaluator
behavior.   The WG had no idea how to change evaluator behavior directly,
so the document attempts to achieve this result indirectly, by advising
domain owners to limit use of DMARC enforcement.

When the issue is framed as a choice between fewer ransomware infections
and less mailing list traffic, or more ransomware infections and more
mailing list traffic, the mailing list traffic will always lose (or at
least it should).   We need to break that tradeoff.

The document concedes defeat by noting that mailing lists have adopted
workarounds, however unpleasant, and therefore the problem does not need to
be solved.  Five years ago, when I joined the group, I was pretty happy
with "problem does not need to be solved," and some members of the group
took great offense at me as a result.   It is ironic that the group has
finally reached that conclusion, while I have moved away from it.  I want
to fix the mailing list problem because I believe it indicates evaluators
are acting against their own interest.  A better understanding of the
filtering problem will both increase security and decrease mailing list
damage.

RFC 7489 offered evaluators a cheap, easily implemented solution to a tiny
subset of the email filtering problem.  Evaluators have been so desperate
for answers to malicious email that they jumped on it.    But the quick
solution comes at a cost, which is best illustrated by an engineering
design axiom that I heard many years ago:  "Good, Fast, Cheap:  pick at
most two!".   RFC 7489 is fast and cheap at the expense of Good.
 FAST-CHEAP pretends that an equivalence exists between authentication
failure and malice, something that is simply not true.  The consequence of
a Fast-Cheap DMARC is (a) the mailing list problem, and (b) inadequate
defenses against the vast majority of impersonation attacks which occur
every day but are not tagged for DMARC enforcement.

There is a GOOD alternative to the FAST-CHEAP mess.   We need to help
evaluators investigate and respond to the root causes of authentication
failure.  The response to a false positive needs to be free of
impersonation risk.  When the focus is placed on tracing the real problem
from authentication failure to root cause, and safe responses are possible,
most mailing lists will be judged acceptable and be granted an exception.

The despair in this document is unnecessary.  The mailing list problem can
be solved while increasing protection from malicious impersonation that
causes ransomware.   I know because I have done it, and done so while the
WG was moving from hope to despair.

Doug







On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 10:59 AM Barry Leiba <[email protected]>
wrote:

> Doug, you have repeated this argument many times in the working
> group's development of the document.  You're repeating it again during
> last call.  You want DMARC to do more than it's designed for.  There
> is very strong consensus in the working group *not* to expand its
> scope -- that DMARC is one part of the overall picture, and is not
> intended to solve all the issues you want to solve.
>
> Your view is valid, but strong working group consensus is in the other
> direction.  You are simply "in the rough" here.
>
> Barry, DMARC working group chair
>
> On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 8:55 AM Douglas Foster
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > What is the public good that DMARC seeks to address?
> >
> > If the goal is to ensure that devastating ransomware attacks are not
> attributable to messages that impersonate a bank, then the goal has been
> acheived.
> >
> > If the goal is to ensure that devastating ransomware attacks are not
> attributable to messages that impersonate any sender, then the goal has not
> been attempted.
> >
> > Doug Foster
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Nov 22, 2024 at 12:17 PM The IESG <[email protected]>
> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> The IESG has received a request from the Domain-based Message
> Authentication,
> >> Reporting & Conformance WG (dmarc) to consider the following document: -
> >> 'Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
> >>    (DMARC) Aggregate Reporting'
> >>   <draft-ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting-23.txt> as Proposed Standard
> >>
> >> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> final
> >> comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> >> [email protected] mailing lists by 2024-12-06. Exceptionally,
> comments may
> >> be sent to [email protected] instead. In either case, please retain the
> beginning
> >> of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
> >>
> >> Abstract
> >>
> >>
> >>    Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
> >>    (DMARC) allows for Domain Owners to request aggregate reports from
> >>    receivers.  This report is an XML document, and contains extensible
> >>    elements that allow for other types of data to be specified later.
> >>    The aggregate reports can be submitted to the Domain Owner's
> >>    specified destination as supported by the receiver.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> The file can be obtained via
> >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting/
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
> >>
> >>
> >> The document contains these normative downward references.
> >> See RFC 3967 for additional information:
> >>     rfc6713: The 'application/zlib' and 'application/gzip' Media Types
> (Informational - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) stream)
> >>     rfc7489: Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and
> Conformance (DMARC) (Informational - Independent Submission stream)
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> dmarc mailing list -- [email protected]
> >> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
>
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