Hi,

Following earlier discussion on the list, I think it may help to make the 
distinction between authentication, trust, and authorization in indirect mail 
flows more explicit.

In particular, the current text in Section 3.2 briefly mentions trust in ARC 
sealers, but I think it may help to make explicit that ARC missed an 
authorization layer.

Possible text for a new section follows.

    ### The Missing Authorization Layer

    ARC, much like DMARC itself, ultimately leaves delivery decisions to
    local receiver policy.  A receiver evaluating a DMARC failure may decide
    to override the domain owner's published policy when a valid ARC chain
    is present.  In practice, this override depends on the degree of trust
    the receiver places in the ARC sealer.

    From the perspective of intermediaries such as mailing lists and
    forwarders, this behavior is fundamentally unpredictable.  A forwarder
    has no practical way to determine whether a receiver trusts a given ARC
    sealer, or under which conditions that trust applies.  As a consequence,
    mailing lists largely abandoned reliance on downstream ARC evaluation
    and instead chose to assume responsibility for the message in the DMARC
    sense, typically by rewriting the From: header field.

    Had there been a standardized mechanism for expressing or querying
    authorization decisions regarding indirect mail flows, the problem
    would likely have evolved differently.  Such a mechanism would not
    necessarily need to alter local receiver policy; merely exposing
    whether a receiver authorizes or trusts a given intermediary or class
    of intermediaries would already constitute an authorization framework.

    In that model, ARC could have operated as part of a more conventional
    authentication and authorization architecture: ARC would authenticate
    the handling path and attest to message custody, while a separate
    authorization layer would express whether that custody is acceptable to
    the receiver for delivery or policy evaluation purposes.

    This distinction helps explain the relative success of DMARC for direct
    mail flows.  In direct delivery, authorization is effectively
    self-asserted: the domain appearing in the From: field publishes the
    policy against which the message is evaluated.  This model aligns with
    DMARC's reliance on visible author identity and preserves one of
    email's defining properties: the ability for any user to contact any
    recipient without prior coordination.

    Indirect mail flows, however, introduce an additional requirement:
    trust in intermediaries.  ARC implicitly assumes the existence of
    reputation systems through which receivers learn to trust specific
    sealers and selectively override DMARC policy failures.  Yet reputation
    is neither explicit nor interoperable.  Operators cannot reliably
    determine whether they are trusted, by whom, or to what extent.  As a
    result, delivery outcomes become probabilistic rather than
    deterministic.

    Moreover, email reputation itself is inherently opaque and
    context-dependent.  It may be sufficient for local operational
    heuristics, but it does not constitute a stable basis for interoperable
    authorization decisions.  This suggests that the missing architectural
    component is not additional authentication, but an explicit
    authorization framework for indirect mail flows.

Comments?

Best
Ale
--





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