Thanks for the answer, Todd.
On 09/06/2026 17:17, Todd Herr wrote:
It is unknown, and perhaps unlikely, that an email message with an
RFC5322.From header domain that has neither an MX record nor an A or
AAAA record will even be considered for message acceptance, let alone
DMARC processing.
We can agree on that, but the "np" tag was introduced nonetheless, so I
suppose it was deemed realistic that a mail receiver reaches the point
where the "np" policy is evaluated even with those premises.
That section reads, in part, "a "NODATA" response (rcode "NOERROR")
means that the given RR type queried for does not exist, but the
domain name does." which seems quite consistent with the first
sentence of the Abstract of 9824 - "a technique to generate a signed
DNS response on demand for a nonexistent name by claiming that the
name exists but doesn't have any data for the queried record type"
True, but RFC 9824 also provides a way to distinguish between "no data
for this RR type" and a non-existent domain name:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9824#name-distinguishing-nonexistent-
Section 6 also states that:
> [...] tools that rely on accurately determining nonexistent names
will need to infer them from the presence of the NXNAME RR type in the
Type Bit Maps field of the NSEC record in NODATA responses from these
servers.
For the hypothetical message with the RFC5322.From domain
subdomain.example.com <http://subdomain.example.com> for which answers
to the following queries are all NODATA:
* The domain's MX record
* The domain's A or AAAA record
* The TXT record _dmarc.subdomain.example.com
<http://dmarc.subdomain.example.com> (assuming it gets that far)
Assuming that such a message isn't outright rejected for there being
no MX or A (or AAAA) record, hen we must ask whether such a message
could pass DMARC validation checks or if the DMARC mechanism even applies.
The DMARC mechanism would apply if example.com <http://example.com>
has published a DMARC policy record (or a subdomain somewhere between
subdomain.example.com <http://subdomain.example.com> and example.com
<http://example.com>, if the tree walk is in effect has published a
DMARC policy record).
If the DMARC mechanism applies, then standard DMARC validation can
take place, and if the message fails DMARC validation, then the
governing DMARC policy record would apply, with that record's p or sp
tag (if it exists) expressing the domain owner's handling preference.
Isn't that precisely the problem here? A domain owner has the
expectation that "np" would be used in this case, not "p" or "sp".
NXDOMAIN and NSEC NXNAME mean the exact same thing, i.e. that the domain
is non-existent, so "np" should apply in both cases.
If the DMARC spec, and therefore implementors, don't take this into
account, isn't this an interoperability issue, especially now that RFC
9824 is a Proposed Standard with already significant real-world usage
(see Cloudflare, NS1, etc.)?
I know it's way too late to raise this, but I'm wondering if this can
either fit as an erratum or if we can agree it's something the WG should
take into consideration in the next DMARC revision (if any, and likely
in a decade :-)).
--
Todd
--
Matteo
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