Please see my response to your erratum.
RFC 9824 section 5 explains how resolvers recover the correct NXDOMAIN
response so they don't break every application that expects NXDOMAIN to
work. We debated this at great length while writing the RFC.
R's,
John
On Tue, 9 Jun 2026, Matteo Contrini wrote:
Hi all,
in RFC 9989, a domain is determined to be non-existent if the response code
for the DNS query is NXDOMAIN. This definition is used in the "np" tag
(non-existent subdomain policy).
However, authoritative name servers doing DNSSEC online signing often use the
so-called "NSEC Black Lies" method, now known as RFC 9824 - Compact Denial of
Existence in DNSSEC, to authenticate non-existent domain responses. Instead
of responding with NXDOMAIN and NSEC/NSEC3 records, they respond with NODATA,
an empty answer section, and a single NSEC record signaling the pseudo-record
type NXNAME.
A DMARC implementation following RFC 9989 would therefore never see NXDOMAIN
and treat all domains using DNSSEC and Compact Denial of Existence as
existent, even if they're not. The issue appears to be potentially
significant since the NSEC Black Lies/Compact Denial of Existence method has
been used extensively in commercial DNS providers, such as Cloudflare (since
2016), NS1 and Bunny DNS.
My question is whether the new "np" tag is therefore to be considered
incompatible with RFC 9824 - Compact Denial of Existence in DNSSEC, or if I
missed something. I've looked at previous discussions in this mailing list
but couldn't find anything relevant. I could only find that RFC 9091, which
RFC 9989 obsoleted, had a broader non-existent definition which also included
NODATA.
Best regards,
--
Matteo
Regards,
John Levine, [email protected], Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly
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