Murray S. Kucherawy writes: > I think we need to consider whether the success criteria were met > generally. I would argue that an existence proof, while > interesting, is probably not sufficient to establish consensus that > the experiment was broadly successful.
So you say it is fine to change the goals of the experiment to make sure we can mark it as failed, as some big players do not want to continue using it. > Put another way: You say it's valuable, but as I understand it, > operators handling enormous mail volumes across the broadest > cross-sections of the Internet have found that it's not. Yes, they are no the target audience for the ARC. Some of those big players does not really care whether they remove your emails that you want to get. You are not costomer for them, you are the product they are selling to their real customers. Every single email that they receive will cost them money, but does not give them anything. They have very different view of the email handling than people who use it for important use cases, where it is much more important that I do not miss any important email, than some random spam in my inbox. Those big players for example do refuse taking the emails in at all. If they would care they would receive it and put it in the spam mailbox, where the customer might actually find it, if they know to search it from there. Also they do not need to use ARC for validation, it is enough that they generate ARC headers when they forward emails. > I'm not asserting that the big operators' opinions should > automatically win the day, but we must reconcile that dissonance > somehow. And I've heard a lot more assertions that it provides no > incremental value than assertions supporting it. Killing ARC from everybody will cause issues for those smaller players who actually care that email is reliable and do get delivered and sorted properly in the final destination. Note, that none of those big players have even implemented per user trusted forwarders list that would make ARC useful for validation purposes. Some of them do implement of way of telling that you have multiple addresses that are forwarded to your email mail box, i.e, you can say that [email protected] is also fine as To address of the email you receive, and should be accepted (or at least they used to allow that, not sure anymore, as i do not use them). Adding user interface to list the trusted forwarder for that additional address, would have made ARC headers added by that host useful, or they could automatically detect the trusted ARC forwarder for that email address after they received first few messages. I do not care if any of them validates ARC, I only care that if someone is forwarding email they should generate ARC headers, so those who actually want to use them can use them. If they disable ARC header generation because it is marked as "historic" then those validators can't use them anymore, and has to go back to Received headers heuristics or similar. > Whatever you may think of ARC and the value it provides, we can't > ignore that adoption remains very low after seven years. My > interpretation is that the community at large just doesn't see value > here. This is presumably after plenty of experimentation at all > levels, given the availability of free implementations, not to > mention genuine deployment and data collection by large operators. Checking snapshot my logs in iki.fi from yesterday, and there was 8973 arc=pass results, 666 arc=reject results out of 149538 emails my random snapshot included. That is about 6% of emails passed through had ARC headers that passed. Whether 6% is good results from this random sample I do not know, but it is not that low either. Note, that there are lots of places who do NOT want to participate in experiments, thus they do not want to use anything that is marked as experemental and the participation might be different if this was actual standard not experimental RFC. > I would argue that a failure criterion, whether express or inferred, > is a lack of uptake. That is not really an experiment, that is deployment. In experiment we see whether this is useful, and then when we found out that it is useful, we can start deploying it and then we should be seeing how many people actually start using it. > I think the more interesting line of inquiry is why uptake didn't > happen. Maybe it was complexity, maybe it was a lack of endorsement > by large mailbox operators, maybe it made headers too ugly, maybe > making the users take extra manual steps is unacceptable, maybe a > mix of those, maybe something else. Knowing that might also help > improve the chances of something like DKIM2 succeeding. DKIM2 is going to be much more complex, so if ARC failed because it was too complex. One way did cause much more complexity was because it required forwarding MTAs to start actually checking SPF, DKIM, and DMARC. Before ARC they could simply pass everything through without modifications can assume that end MTA will sort things out (except for SPF, which would fail anyways, but that is different thing). Can't say anything about the lack of endorsement, but I do not think there is any difference between ARC and DKIM headers, both are about the same ugliness. I think one of the endorsement issues was that we did not get the actual user interfaces of those end mailbox providers to include "This email seems to have been forwrdeded to you by @iki.fi. Is something you have requested, and if so do you want to add iki.fi to your trusted forwarders list". They do have userinterfaces for marking emails as spam or not spam, so adding another for trusted forwaders should not be too hard. On the other hand they might have wanted to see whether ARC experiment succeeds before starting to make changes to their user interface... -- [email protected] _______________________________________________ dmarc mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
