On Thu 16/Jul/2026 08:19:02 +0200 Richard Clayton wrote:
In message <[email protected]>, Alessandro Vesely 
<[email protected]> writes
On Wed 15/Jul/2026 19:43:50 +0200 John R Levine wrote:

[...] As we know from the previous discussion on this topic on this list, Y tells us that they had to ignore G's ARC chains because they signed messages that took insecure routes and were silently modified.

This is not reported in the I-D. It sounds like a sort of ARC-replay problem, correct?

draft-adams-arc-experiment-conclusion-01 said:

    *  Abuse of trusted chains: Attackers have been leveraging situations
       where recipients trusted ARC chains by modifying email after an
       initial attestation and then passing it to another entity which
       trusted that attestation.  Assessing whether the email came
       directly from the entity at the head of the ARC chain is complex
       and assessing whether or not any changes to the email were made by
       a trusted signer or a malicious third party has proved to be
       impossible.


Yeah, only the top ARC set, or maybe it's called tail of the chain, can be trusted. This should have been made clear from start.


but this (and some other material I contributed) did not make it into draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-to-historic-00

I rather suspect that this was not intended to happen and an old version of the draft (pre-appearance in the WG) was uploaded when the document was adopted :-(

Indeed, the paragraph quoted above was added in release -01. Yet another candidate addition to draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-to-historic.


Best
Ale
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