On Thu 16/Jul/2026 08:19:02 +0200 Richard Clayton wrote:
In message <[email protected]>, Alessandro Vesely
<[email protected]> writes
On Wed 15/Jul/2026 19:43:50 +0200 John R Levine wrote:
[...] As we know from the previous discussion on this topic on this
list, Y tells us that they had to ignore G's ARC chains because they signed
messages that took insecure routes and were silently modified.
This is not reported in the I-D. It sounds like a sort of ARC-replay problem,
correct?
draft-adams-arc-experiment-conclusion-01 said:
* Abuse of trusted chains: Attackers have been leveraging situations
where recipients trusted ARC chains by modifying email after an
initial attestation and then passing it to another entity which
trusted that attestation. Assessing whether the email came
directly from the entity at the head of the ARC chain is complex
and assessing whether or not any changes to the email were made by
a trusted signer or a malicious third party has proved to be
impossible.
Yeah, only the top ARC set, or maybe it's called tail of the chain, can be
trusted. This should have been made clear from start.
but this (and some other material I contributed) did not make it into
draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-to-historic-00
I rather suspect that this was not intended to happen and an old version
of the draft (pre-appearance in the WG) was uploaded when the document
was adopted :-(
Indeed, the paragraph quoted above was added in release -01. Yet another
candidate addition to draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-to-historic.
Best
Ale
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