On Fri 17/Jul/2026 17:31:46 +0200 Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
On Wed, Jul 15, 2026 at 10:40 AM Alessandro Vesely <[email protected]> wrote:

I think it's important to understand why the experiment didn't produce the expected results. However, neither the I-D nor the RFC state exactly what results were expected. Conveying original authentication assessments across trust boundaries, as a goal, was certainly achieved. Fixing indirect mail flows certainly not.

I thought the Abstract and Introduction sections of RFC 8617 clearly described the expected result: ARC was meant to provide information supplemental to DKIM enough to resolve the indirect mail flow problem.


I agree that this was the aspiration. However, RFC 8617 does not actually say that the additional information resolves the mailing list problem. It says that the additional information can be used to inform message disposition. It does not claim that the additional information is, by itself, sufficient to justify overriding DMARC policy. In practice, it is not.

In hindsight, this left a significant gap between the protocol mechanism and its operational use. The RFC deliberately stops short of specifying how receivers should use ARC results in disposition decisions, apparently expecting operational practice to evolve separately. That never really happened. Ideas such as a broadly shared trust database did not materialize, and there was no common understanding of when ARC evidence should justify overriding a DMARC failure.


Apparently, broadly, it didn't.


Without a shared operational model, deployment remained limited, and different implementations developed different interpretations of the protocol. I would argue that what fell short was not so much the protocol as the operational ecosystem around it.


Best
Ale
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