On Fri 17/Jul/2026 17:31:46 +0200 Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
On Wed, Jul 15, 2026 at 10:40 AM Alessandro Vesely <[email protected]> wrote:
I think it's important to understand why the experiment didn't produce the
expected results. However, neither the I-D nor the RFC state exactly what
results were expected. Conveying original authentication assessments across
trust boundaries, as a goal, was certainly achieved. Fixing indirect mail
flows certainly not.
I thought the Abstract and Introduction sections of RFC 8617 clearly
described the expected result: ARC was meant to provide information
supplemental to DKIM enough to resolve the indirect mail flow problem.
I agree that this was the aspiration. However, RFC 8617 does not actually say
that the additional information resolves the mailing list problem. It says
that the additional information can be used to inform message disposition. It
does not claim that the additional information is, by itself, sufficient to
justify overriding DMARC policy. In practice, it is not.
In hindsight, this left a significant gap between the protocol mechanism and
its operational use. The RFC deliberately stops short of specifying how
receivers should use ARC results in disposition decisions, apparently expecting
operational practice to evolve separately. That never really happened. Ideas
such as a broadly shared trust database did not materialize, and there was no
common understanding of when ARC evidence should justify overriding a DMARC
failure.
Apparently, broadly, it didn't.
Without a shared operational model, deployment remained limited, and different
implementations developed different interpretations of the protocol. I would
argue that what fell short was not so much the protocol as the operational
ecosystem around it.
Best
Ale
--
_______________________________________________
dmarc mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]