Richard said that in the absence of ARC, the message would have been
blocked.  I assume it would have been blocked for DMARC failure.

On Fri, Jul 31, 2026, 6:40 AM Alessandro Vesely <[email protected]> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> it is not easy to understand what happened at Yahoo.  The statement
> relayed by
> Richard (and quoted below) may shred some further light after John's
> summary:
>
>      Y tells us that they had to ignore G's ARC chains because they signed
>      messages that took insecure routes and were silently modified.
>
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dmarc/ZTIYuQG9oCOP7bmc7WoYAWIgicM
>
> and Richard's quote of draft-adams-arc-experiment-conclusion-01:
>
>     *  Abuse of trusted chains: Attackers have been leveraging situations
>        where recipients trusted ARC chains by modifying email after an
>        initial attestation and then passing it to another entity which
>        trusted that attestation.  Assessing whether the email came
>        directly from the entity at the head of the ARC chain is complex
>        and assessing whether or not any changes to the email were made by
>        a trusted signer or a malicious third party has proved to be
>        impossible.
>
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dmarc/pfleAeQo_bacxA9a4yhs7gEuDWI
>
> Messages apparently followed a path like:
>
>      Originator -> G (adding an ARC set) -> bad guy (modifying the
> message) -> Y
>
> However, it is not explained whether the bad guy added a second ARC set or
> how
> the message could have been modified without invalidating G's signature.
>
>
> Best
> Ale
>
>
> On Thu 30/Jul/2026 20:07:34 +0200 Richard Clayton wrote:
> > In message <[email protected]
> > il.com>, Barry Leiba <[email protected]> writes
> >
> >>The next step is for those who still want to proceed with making ARC
> >>Historic *now*... to respond to these objections and either accept the
> >>suggestion to wait, or to address reasons we should not.
> >
> > I would like to relay a statement (sorry for the delay, but these things
> > need some approvals):
> >
> > ----
> >
> > At Yahoo we have read with interest the recent discussions about
> > documenting the end of the ARC experiment.
> >
> > We have not been applying ARC headers to any email and we will not be
> > doing so in the future.
> >
> > We have experimented with accepting ARC information from other senders.
> > Our experience has been that this has DECREASED our ability to identify
> > email that our users do not wish to receive. It has not improved our
> > ability to identify valid email that has been forwarded by others,
> > instead our trust in senders to report useful and valid information to
> > us has been misplaced on several occasions. We have taken several large
> > senders off our "trusted list" as a result, and we will not be spending
> > any effort in adding any new senders to our (now extremely short) list.
> >
> > Counting by domain we currently see about 12,000 users of ARC -- which
> > may sound a lot but it is rather less than half of one percent of the
> > domains sending us email each day. That is we conclude that, even after
> > about 10 years, adoption has been very low indeed.
> >
> > We would not encourage any other senders to bother with ARC, instead
> > they should engage with the DKIM2 initiative which we believe will be of
> > significant use in improving our ability to identify mail which our
> > users want.
> >
> >
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