Richard said that in the absence of ARC, the message would have been blocked. I assume it would have been blocked for DMARC failure.
On Fri, Jul 31, 2026, 6:40 AM Alessandro Vesely <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi, > > it is not easy to understand what happened at Yahoo. The statement > relayed by > Richard (and quoted below) may shred some further light after John's > summary: > > Y tells us that they had to ignore G's ARC chains because they signed > messages that took insecure routes and were silently modified. > > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dmarc/ZTIYuQG9oCOP7bmc7WoYAWIgicM > > and Richard's quote of draft-adams-arc-experiment-conclusion-01: > > * Abuse of trusted chains: Attackers have been leveraging situations > where recipients trusted ARC chains by modifying email after an > initial attestation and then passing it to another entity which > trusted that attestation. Assessing whether the email came > directly from the entity at the head of the ARC chain is complex > and assessing whether or not any changes to the email were made by > a trusted signer or a malicious third party has proved to be > impossible. > > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dmarc/pfleAeQo_bacxA9a4yhs7gEuDWI > > Messages apparently followed a path like: > > Originator -> G (adding an ARC set) -> bad guy (modifying the > message) -> Y > > However, it is not explained whether the bad guy added a second ARC set or > how > the message could have been modified without invalidating G's signature. > > > Best > Ale > > > On Thu 30/Jul/2026 20:07:34 +0200 Richard Clayton wrote: > > In message <[email protected] > > il.com>, Barry Leiba <[email protected]> writes > > > >>The next step is for those who still want to proceed with making ARC > >>Historic *now*... to respond to these objections and either accept the > >>suggestion to wait, or to address reasons we should not. > > > > I would like to relay a statement (sorry for the delay, but these things > > need some approvals): > > > > ---- > > > > At Yahoo we have read with interest the recent discussions about > > documenting the end of the ARC experiment. > > > > We have not been applying ARC headers to any email and we will not be > > doing so in the future. > > > > We have experimented with accepting ARC information from other senders. > > Our experience has been that this has DECREASED our ability to identify > > email that our users do not wish to receive. It has not improved our > > ability to identify valid email that has been forwarded by others, > > instead our trust in senders to report useful and valid information to > > us has been misplaced on several occasions. We have taken several large > > senders off our "trusted list" as a result, and we will not be spending > > any effort in adding any new senders to our (now extremely short) list. > > > > Counting by domain we currently see about 12,000 users of ARC -- which > > may sound a lot but it is rather less than half of one percent of the > > domains sending us email each day. That is we conclude that, even after > > about 10 years, adoption has been very low indeed. > > > > We would not encourage any other senders to bother with ARC, instead > > they should engage with the DKIM2 initiative which we believe will be of > > significant use in improving our ability to identify mail which our > > users want. > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > dmarc mailing list -- [email protected] > > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] > > _______________________________________________ > dmarc mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >
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