Sorry if this is too naive, but in your Outlook.com example, if Outlook.com hypothetically added an ARC property like

|arc-recipient-domain=AttackPartner.com|

Wouldn't that expose to VictimDomain.com that the message had originally been delivered to |AttackPartner.com|, hence something seems wrong with the aligned SPF PASS at the end ?

-Carlos

On 14/08/2026 13:10, Douglas Foster wrote:
Awhile back, someone described the SPF upgrade attack to this list, particularly mentioning Outlook.com

  * Bad guy initiates an impersonation message claiming to be from
    Megabank.Com.   Megabank.com is known to be hosted on Outlook.com
  * The bad guys send the malicious impersonation to his controlled
    domain AttackPartner.com, which is also hosted on Outlook.com.
  * AttackPartner.com accepts the message even though it fails SPF and
    DKIM, because it is part of the attack.
  * AttackPartner.com auto-forwards the message to VictimDomain.com,
    preserving the original SMTP address, remaining anonymous.  The
    message is accepted based on aligned SPF Pass.
  * VictimDomain.com acts on the message as if it is truly from Megabank.

Ways that the attack might be exposed:

  * If the hosting service rejects the original message because it
    lacks authentication.
  * If the hosting service enforces Mail From rewrite, with or without
    SRS encoding, then the role of AttackPartner.com would be exposed,
    and SPF Pass would be based on that domain.
  * If the hosting service created two ARC sets, one that documented
    the original destination domain and one that documented the final
    destination domain.   However, destination domains do not
    generally appear in ARC sets.   ARC was supposed to help us
    identify forwarding activity.   A forwarder who preserves the Mail
    From address is indistinguishable from an outbound gateway
    service, even with ARC.

DKIM2 gives us the destination domain information which ARC lacks, but DKIM2 will not be used by a malicious impersonator. Even if DKIM2 allows a domain owner to specify that DKIM2 is mandatory, the attacker will simply redirect his attacks to a domain which does not have this enforcement specified.

So we have no solution and no plan for a solution?

Doug Foster


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