Awhile back, someone described the SPF upgrade attack to this list,
particularly mentioning Outlook.com

   - Bad guy initiates an impersonation message claiming to be from
   Megabank.Com.   Megabank.com is known to be hosted on Outlook.com
   - The bad guys send the malicious impersonation to his controlled domain
   AttackPartner.com, which is also hosted on Outlook.com.
   - AttackPartner.com accepts the message even though it fails SPF and
   DKIM, because it is part of the attack.
   - AttackPartner.com auto-forwards the message to VictimDomain.com,
   preserving the original SMTP address, remaining anonymous.  The message is
   accepted based on aligned SPF Pass.
   - VictimDomain.com acts on the message as if it is truly from Megabank.

Ways that the attack might be exposed:

   - If the hosting service rejects the original message because it lacks
   authentication.
   - If the hosting service enforces Mail From rewrite, with or without SRS
   encoding, then the role of AttackPartner.com would be exposed, and SPF Pass
   would be based on that domain.
   - If the hosting service created two ARC sets, one that documented the
   original destination domain and one that documented the final destination
   domain.   However, destination domains do not generally appear in ARC
   sets.   ARC was supposed to help us identify forwarding activity.   A
   forwarder who preserves the Mail From address is indistinguishable from an
   outbound gateway service, even with ARC.

DKIM2 gives us the destination domain information which ARC lacks, but
DKIM2 will not be used by a malicious impersonator.
Even if DKIM2 allows a domain owner to specify that DKIM2 is mandatory, the
attacker will simply redirect his attacks to a domain which does not have
this enforcement specified.

So we have no solution and no plan for a solution?

Doug Foster
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