On Nov 22, 2018, at 4:29 AM, Barry Raveendran Greene <[email protected]> wrote: > The irony is that this work is operationally destabilizing to the Internet > and Telecom. We’re moving to an environment where the strength of a resilient > ASN recovering communications in a disaster will be tested over and over > again. How will an ASN keep critical services on-line when they are > disconnected from the “cloud,” disconnected from their upstream, and now > “disconnected from the DNS resolution path? > > Exasperated customer calling after a hurricane, “ISP customer service, I need > to get to emergency services, but my app will not work.” The ISP responds > with “sorry, that app will not work in a situation where we’re struggling > with emergency services.” > > The “trade off” to move the DNS architecture away from residents to privacy > is going to get people killed.
If a browser forces DoH in cases where there are no working DoH servers, that will absolutely be the case. It will even be the case if the user can manually turn off DoH, but only if the user know the correct UI incantation. It is reasonable to assume (but not assured) that browser vendors are aware of this. --Paul
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