On Tue, 29 Oct 2019, Paul Hoffman wrote:
I have to say that I'm pretty surprised by the idea that TLS in this context should
behave any differently than TLS in application layer contexts, and I'm a little concerned
about having configuration options for this that amount to "ignore errors of types
$FOO".
TLS in application layers can specify that opportunistic encryption, yes?
Accepting self-signed certificates is a known configuration, so I get that,
but if someone has configured roots of trust, accepting other certificates
outside the roots of trust in the configuration is pretty odd practice.
Do you feel that there is a requirement that all recursive resolvers use the
same set of trust anchors? If not, and if you are against the use of
opportunistic encryption in this case, who will decide what set of trust
anchors all resolvers in all jurisdictions will use?
Ideally, with TLSA records involved, DNS resolvers wouldn't need any
webpki based external CA trust anchors, and things would have valid
verification chains using DNSSEC. If you don't, then all the same issues
from mozilla and apple and windows having a different set of trusted
CA's will affect encrypted DNS between resolvers and auth servers. And
likely means a restricted artificial market with only a few accepted
CAs. Which is all irrespective of the Opportunisitc behaviour.
Paul
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