Hi Scott,
     Thanks for kicking this discussion off. A question (or two) inline
for us to consider...

On 3/19/21 7:10 AM, Hollenbeck, Scott wrote:
> Section 9.1 of draft-ietf-dprive-phase2-requirements currently contains this 
> text:
> 
> "As recursors typically forwards queries received from the user to 
> authoritative servers.  This creates a transitive trust between the user and 
> the recursor, as well as the authoritative server, since information created 
> by the user is exposed to the authoritative server.  However, the user never 
> has a chance to identify what data was exposed to which authoritative party 
> (via which path).
> 
> Also, Users would want to be informed about the status of the connections 
> which were made on their behalf, which adds a fourth point
> 
> Encryption/privacy status signaling
> 
> *TODO*: Actual requirements - what do users "want"?  Start below:"
> 
> I'm not sure there's much to be added here since users currently have no 
> ability to pick and choose services that a recursive resolver negotiates with 
> an authoritative name server. The user can pick a recursive resolver based on 
> the set of services it provides, and that's about it. I'd like to suggest 
> that we replace the above text with something like the following:
> 
> "Recursive resolvers typically act as intermediaries.  They forward queries 
> received from users to authoritative servers without any configurable and/or 
> measurable interaction between the user and the authoritative name servers. 
> As when making requests through other intermediaries, users do not 
> necessarily have the ability to identify information that is disclosed by the 
> intermediary to other service provider, i.e., an authoritative server in this 
> case. As such,
> users should simply choose a recursor that provides a set of services that 
> best meets the user's need for information protection, along with other 
> considerations."
> 

>From the pure user perspective, do they even know that their "DNS
server" is an intermediary?

What phase 2 requirement can be derived from the above?

Regards,
Brian

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