Hi Scott,
Thanks for kicking this discussion off. A question (or two) inline
for us to consider...
On 3/19/21 7:10 AM, Hollenbeck, Scott wrote:
> Section 9.1 of draft-ietf-dprive-phase2-requirements currently contains this
> text:
>
> "As recursors typically forwards queries received from the user to
> authoritative servers. This creates a transitive trust between the user and
> the recursor, as well as the authoritative server, since information created
> by the user is exposed to the authoritative server. However, the user never
> has a chance to identify what data was exposed to which authoritative party
> (via which path).
>
> Also, Users would want to be informed about the status of the connections
> which were made on their behalf, which adds a fourth point
>
> Encryption/privacy status signaling
>
> *TODO*: Actual requirements - what do users "want"? Start below:"
>
> I'm not sure there's much to be added here since users currently have no
> ability to pick and choose services that a recursive resolver negotiates with
> an authoritative name server. The user can pick a recursive resolver based on
> the set of services it provides, and that's about it. I'd like to suggest
> that we replace the above text with something like the following:
>
> "Recursive resolvers typically act as intermediaries. They forward queries
> received from users to authoritative servers without any configurable and/or
> measurable interaction between the user and the authoritative name servers.
> As when making requests through other intermediaries, users do not
> necessarily have the ability to identify information that is disclosed by the
> intermediary to other service provider, i.e., an authoritative server in this
> case. As such,
> users should simply choose a recursor that provides a set of services that
> best meets the user's need for information protection, along with other
> considerations."
>
>From the pure user perspective, do they even know that their "DNS
server" is an intermediary?
What phase 2 requirement can be derived from the above?
Regards,
Brian
_______________________________________________
dns-privacy mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy