> On 5 May 2021, at 05:44, Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
> Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-dprive-xfr-over-tls-11: Discuss
>
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> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dprive-xfr-over-tls/
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>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ———————————————————————————————————
Hi Ben,
Thanks for the review. I’m addressing just the DISCUSS points in this mail and
will follow up separately on the COMMENTS:
>
> My understanding is that this point is essentially overtaken by events,
> as a similar concern was raised already by Martin D, John, and Roman,
> and there is a commitment to update the text already made. I'm putting
> it in at the Discuss level to make sure that I follow-up on the revised
> text when it appears.
As Allison already stated in reply to Martin, the authors agree that the `dot`
ALPN should be used here, in light of the recent discussions.
In terms of updating the text, I believe what is required is to add a new
section at the start of section 8:
"8.1 Connection establishment
During connection establishment the ALPN token “dot” [ref] MUST be selected in
the crypto handshake.”
I believe the later text relating to XoT vs ADoT in section 8.6 is still fully
applicable, unless you see something you believe also needs updating?
I will also update the first paragraph of Appendix A to reflect that the main
reason for not using a separate ALPN (as originally proposed) is actually
because XoT is DNS and so should share the `dot` ALPN.
>
> But, for concreteness: the text in Sections 8.4, 10.4, and 11 treat
> cryptographic mTLS, TSIG, and SIG(0) authentication as providing an
> equivalent level of protection to the (non-cryptographic) IP ACL. My
> understanding is that IETF consensus is to prefer cryptographic
> mechanisms for authentication and authorization, when available.
That wasn’t the intention at all, and we are happy to add text to clarify that.
To address this I would propose the following updates:
Section 8.4:
OLD:
" o the server MUST validate the client is authorized to request or
proxy a zone transfer by using one or both of the following:
* an IP based ACL (which can be either per-message or per-
connection)
* Mutual TLS (mTLS)
NEW
" o the server MUST validate the client is authorized to request or
proxy a zone transfer by using one or both of the following:
* Mutual TLS (mTLS)
* an IP based ACL (which can be either per-message or per-
connection)
If only one method is selected then mTLS is preferred because it provides
strong cryptographic protection."
Section 10.4 (similar to text already proposed to Martin Duke). Add at the end
of the second paragraph:
“mTLS provides a stronger authentication of the client than an IP ACL because
it is based directly on a cryptographically verified identity.”
Section 11:
OLD:
“The following table summarizes the properties of a selection of the mechanisms
discussed in Section 10."
NEW:
"The following table summarizes the high level properties of a selection of the
mechanisms discussed in Section 10 (it does not, however, imply that methods
that share the same basic property provide equivalent protection.)
OLD:
“ * Using just Mutual TLS can be considered a standalone solution since both
end points are cryptographically authenticated.
* Using Strict TLS and an IP based ACL on the primary also provides
authentication of both end points”
NEW:
“ * Using Mutual TLS is a standalone solution since both end points are
cryptographically authenticated. This is the preferred mode because it provides
the strongest protection.
* Using Strict TLS and an IP based ACL on the primary also provides
authentication of both end points, although here only the server is
authenticated cryptographically.”
>
> Relatedly, the text in Section 8.4 says that TSIG/SIG(0) are "not
> sufficient to authenticate the client or server", which is technically
> true, but also seems misleading. In XFR scenarios it's not clear that
> specific identification (authentication) of the counterparty is
> necessary for secure operation, if authorization to receive/send the
> zone can be established without specific identification. My
> undersatnding is that, when combined with a strict TLS profile for
> server authentication and appropriate trust policy on TLS clients, TSIG
> and SIG(0) both serve to provide proof of authorization for the exchange
> even though they only provide authentication in the form of group
> membership (the relevant key material is typically available to multiple
> machines). As such, don't they provide strong enough cryptographic
> protection (and end-to-end, no less!) to be a superior authorization
> mechanism than an IP ACL? (Any resulting text changes may bleed into
> Sections 11 and 12 in addition to 8.4, per my COMMENT.)
So I _think_ your question here is why isn’t TSIG also considered a valid
option in combination with Strict TLS?
The reason is that TSIG signed requests can be forwarded by a third party. The
signature is ONLY over the DNS message payload, so it doesn’t cover the
identity of the originator. That means that if only a TSIG is required, the
server cannot be sure that the client originating the TLS connection is not an
on-path attacker forwarding requests, and therefore inspecting the zone
transfer responses. (The real value of TSIG is that the client can be sure the
response hasn’t been tampered with and so it has a valid XFR response before
applying the update, but in practice it is also widely used today in
combination with IP ACLs to limit the sending of XFR responses).
I think we could improve the text to clarify this. How about:
Section 8.4
OLD:
“The server MAY also require a valid TSIG/SIG(0) signature, but this
alone is not sufficient to authenticate the client or server.”
NEW:
“The server MAY also require a valid TSIG/SIG(0) signature, but this
alone is not sufficient to authenticate that the TLS client is authorised to
receive a XoT transfer (e.g., is not an on-path attacker forwarding TSIG/SIG(0)
signed DNS message payload.)”
And then in section 10 I’ll make clear that only the DNS message payload is
signed with TSIG (it currently says ‘message/DNS message’, which is unclear).
Best regards
Sara.
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