(Responding only on the DNS list to avoid cross posting.) At 14:11 +0200 6/9/08, bert hubert wrote: >On Mon, Jun 09, 2008 at 02:02:05PM +0200, Antoin Verschuren wrote: >(...) >> I'm very afraid that Mozilla is trying to hijack the authority model here. > >You can't hijack something that does not exist though, which is what I think >is the problem here.
Yes you can hijack something that doesn't exist (for varying values of existence). This is the same situation that the RIRs faced with the bogon lists for IP address prefixes. (The problem peaked as recently as 2005 - i.e., it was a recent one.) ISPs would filter out all traffic to the unallocated slash-8's (as listed by IANA as inactive). When an RIR was allocated a slash-8, even an announcement on mailing lists wasn't enough to get all filters changed. Now the RIR's put in test addresses for traceroutes and pings to allow checks for bad filters. If the browsers do implement a check based on TLD name, I bet they are also gullible enough to implement RFC 3514. Keep in mind that there is more than just the ICANN root zone DNS in the world. Perhaps the thought is that it is the only legitimate root zone on the global public Internet but there are other global inter-networks. These networks also employ DNS albeit operating under a private administration. A browser that is hard-wired for the global public Internet would be a problem on these private networks. -- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Edward Lewis +1-571-434-5468 NeuStar Never confuse activity with progress. Activity pays more. _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
