On 12/03/2019 01:54, nalini elkins wrote: > Stephen, > >> TLS1.3 will, I expect, noticeably improve security for an awful lot of >> enterprises in time. > > I am sure you are right.
Great. > There is also likely to be quite a bit of pain > ahead for many. I don't agree at all about that, despite claims to the contrary from you and some others. But that topic was debated at length already. (Seriously, do you expect some other outcome if you re-start that debate?) > Also, > this is exactly why I propose a neutral observer who might tease out the > nuances. I think that's an outstandingly bad idea. The IETF has no voting and hence no electorate nor constituency and hence no identifiable non-voting population from whom ostensibly neutral observers could be chosen via some (currently non-existent) IETF process. In addition to be just being a bad idea, what you appear to be suggesting seems to me like it'd require fundamental change to the core of the IETF and to also be entirely off topic for the subject line of this mail. S. > Or > say something along the lines of "if you do x, you will need to do y". It > may also be > needed to have subtopics. And, the pro and con sides could also provide a > writeup. > The write up could also propose transition strategies. > > I am trying to make it so that people, including enterprises, can better > decide the merits of the > situation for themselves. > > Many people do not have the time, expertise or energy to follow these > discussions which > have gone on for a number of years. I have also seen assessments of > protocol changes from people > who have "a dog in the hunt" so to speak. That is, vendors who provide an > assessment which > (shockingly enough) results in their own products (which again shockingly, > cost money) being the best > solution. There is much hyperbole on all sides of not just the TLS1.3 > issue but DoH also. > > I compliment the authors of the current drafts on DoH deployment drafts for > good efforts to bring > light to this subject. > > Having said that, I would like to see IETF work with a neutral third party, > maybe an academic institution, > or CERT, or someone else help people, including enterprise operators, who > have to make decisions to > implement these protocols and possibly change their architecture > strategies. Even if we manage to > come to consensus on an IETF draft and create an RFC on DoH deployment, > many enterprises do not > keep up with all RFCs nor do they always have the time to evaluate > everything properly because they > are so busy with the fires of the current day. I worked for large > enterprises for many years doing network > design and troubleshooting. I was always extremely busy fighting the > issues of the day. > > Enterprises, and many others, do pay attention to what NIST or CERT says. > Just my 2 cents to try > to find a long term solution to what has been a contentious and exhausting > multi-year set of discussions > for all involved and which seems set to rekindle with DoH. > > Nalini > > On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 5:30 AM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie> > wrote: > >> >> (This distribution list is too scattered and diverse. Be >> great if some AD or someone just picked one list for this. >> In the meantime...) >> >> On 11/03/2019 20:43, nalini elkins wrote: >>> impact assessment that certain changes such as >>> DoH and TLS1.3 will have on enterprises, >> >> TLS1.3 will, I expect, noticeably improve security for an awful >> lot of enterprises in time. >> >> As for DoH, I wonder has anyone done studies on how split-horizon >> names and access patterns leak today? >> >> I don't recall having read that kind of study. I can imagine >> many ways in which that kind of stuff would leak. I'd be very >> surprised if it never happens. I don't know how often it does. >> >> For names, leaking once is kinda fatal. For access patterns, >> I guess one leak exposes an IP address that's interested in a >> name (e.g. secret-project.example.com) but more would be >> needed for broader access patterns to be exposed to "foreign" >> recursives and/or in-band networks. >> >> ISTM that it is quite possible that enterprises that deploy their >> own DoH services could potentially reduce such leakage and gain >> overall. (I'm assuming here that sensible browser-makers will >> end up providing something that works for browsers running in >> networks with split-horizon setups before those browsers turn >> on DoH as a default at scale.) >> >> Cheers, >> S. >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > dns-privacy mailing list > dns-priv...@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy >
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