Hi Eric,

In TLS 1.2, it is possible for firewalls to inspect the TLS handshake, and 
white-list, black-list and grey-list TLS session based on the server identity. 
In other words, middleboxes are conditionally acting as TLS proxies to specific 
servers (categorized in the grey-list).
With TLS 1.3 and encrypted SNI, the middle box now has to act as a TLS proxy 
for all the flows.

-Tiru

From: Eric Rescorla <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2019 3:14 AM
To: Paul Vixie <[email protected]>
Cc: nalini elkins <[email protected]>; Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy 
<[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected]; Ackermann, 
Michael <[email protected]>; Christian Huitema <[email protected]>; 
[email protected]; Vittorio Bertola 
<[email protected]>; Stephen Farrell 
<[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [Doh] [dns-privacy] [DNSOP] New: draft-bertola-bcp-doh-clients


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On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 11:13 AM Paul Vixie 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:


nalini elkins wrote on 2019-03-11 10:26:
> Tiru,
>
> Thanks for your comments.
>
>  > Enterprise networks are already able to block DoH services,
i wonder if everyone here knows that TLS 1.3 and encrypted headers is
going to push a SOCKS agenda onto enterprises that had not previously
needed one,

I'm pretty familiar with TLS 1.3, but I don't know what this means. TLS 1.3
doesn't generally encrypt headers any more than TLS 1.2 did, except for
the content type byte, which isn't that useful for inspection anyway.
Are you perchance referring to encrypted SNI? Something else?

-Ekr

and that simply blocking every external endpoint known or
tested to support DoH will be the cheaper alternative, even if that
makes millions of other endpoints at google, cloudflare, cisco, and ibm
unreachable as a side effect?

CF has so far only supported DoH on 1.1.1.0/24<http://1.1.1.0/24> and 
1.0.1.0/24<http://1.0.1.0/24>, which i
blocked already (before DoH) so that's not a problem. but if google
decides to support DoH on the same IP addresses and port numbers that
are used for some API or web service i depend on, that web service is
going to be either blocked, or forced to go through SOCKS. this will add
considerable cost to my network policy. (by design.)

--
P Vixie

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