[There is actually a proposal at the bottom of this e-mail. Bear with me.] On 20 Mar 2019, at 11:09, Jared Mauch <ja...@puck.nether.net> wrote:
> Often as an industry we may discuss various solutions that are great for > oneself but don’t scale when looking at the big picture. I think what we are seeing is the fundamental tension between privacy and control. You need to give up some privacy in order to make the control possible; you need to give up some control in order to afford privacy. Some in this thread want certainty that they are able to exercise control, e.g. for devices in their network. Some in this thread want certainty that they can obtain privacy, e.g. for for their device in any network. When those people meet, the pitchforks come out. This is already true today; it's not a new DoH problem. I think the balance of the tensions has shifted with the prospect of a change in default behaviour, not because any of this is fundamentally new. The change in defaults tips the power balance (e.g. the balance of cost) between control and privacy. This is Paul's basic point, I think. Some people seem to be getting worked up about whether the desire for control is more important than the desire for privacy. I don't think that question has an answer, but I think most reasonable people could acknowledge that both positions exist. This is Stephen's basic point, I think. It's possible today to communicate over covert channels in order to avoid control. This is different from *all* communication happening over covert channels so that no control in the future is possible. That's not how things happen today; that would be a change, a new situation. This is your basic point, I think (that's how I read "scale" in your e-mail, above). Seems to me that there's a middle ground within sight here. Standardise this privacy mechanism, and specify (with reasoning) that it should be implemented such that the existence of the channel (but not the content) can be identified as distinct from other traffic by third parties. Maybe specify use of a different port number, as was done with DoT. Those who choose to ignore that direction and create a covert channel using port 443 instead will do so. Nothing much we can do to stop that today (I guarantee it is already happening). The future is not really different. Of course when people shift the focus of the conversation from DoH in general to resolverless DNS, and want to interleave DNS messages with HTML and cat GIFs over the same HTTPS bundles, the pitchforks will need to come out again. So keep them handy. Joe _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
