> On 5 Nov 2026, at 08:42, Mark Andrews <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> You replace the first label with one that sorts after it as the next name.
> Append a 0x00 octet if there is space otherwise increment the last octet by
> one. If that overflows remove the last octet and increment the second last
> octet. If that overflows remove it and increment the new last octet. Repeat.
> If the label is exhausted apply this to the second last label. If it is in
> the zone otherwise use the zone origin.
If the octet has the value 0x5a (Z) then you down case the value to 0x7a (z)
and increment to get 0x7b ({).
There is space:
A -> A\000
There was not space and the last character is Z:
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ ->
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz ->
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz{
There was not space and the last character isn't Z:
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZA ->
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZB
There was not space and the last character is 0xff and the second last
character is Z:
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ\255 ->
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ{
> --
> Mark Andrews
>
>> On 4 Nov 2026, at 23:12, Rifat Jumagulov <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> Hello,
>>
>> RFC 4470 Section 4 builds the next name this way: "To increment a name, add
>> a leading label with a single null (zero-value) octet." For
>> https://www.google.com/url?q=http://foo.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E
>> it gives an NSEC record with next name
>> \https://www.google.com/url?q=http://000.foo.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E,
>> and it says: "The first of these NSEC RRs proves that no exact match for
>> https://www.google.com/url?q=http://foo.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E
>> exists"
>>
>> RFC 8198 Appendix B reads the same form differently: "If the next domain
>> name is a subdomain of the given name, you have an ENT. Otherwise, you have
>> an NXDOMAIN."
>> \https://www.google.com/url?q=http://000.foo.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E
>> is a subdomain of
>> https://www.google.com/url?q=http://foo.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E,
>> so this NSEC shows an empty non-terminal, not a missing name. Section 3 of
>> RFC 4470 also says: "This change is expected to be fully compatible with all
>> existing DNSSEC validators."
>>
>> Erratum 6734 (Reported, Mark Andrews) makes the general point: \000.domain
>> can only prove no data at domain, not that domain does not exist. It has no
>> corrected text yet. RFC 7129 Appendix A prints the same form, NSEC
>> \https://www.google.com/url?q=http://000.b.example.org&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E.
>>
>> Local test: a zone with the two NSEC records of the Section 4 example,
>> signed with ECDSAP256SHA256, served by NSD 4.15.4 and by Knot DNS 3.6.2,
>> which both return NXDOMAIN with both records. Query
>> https://www.google.com/url?q=http://foo.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E.
>> A with DO=1. BIND 9.20.30, Unbound 1.24.0, Knot Resolver 6.5.1 and PowerDNS
>> Recursor 5.4.9 all answer SERVFAIL.
>> https://www.google.com/url?q=http://example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E.
>> SOA gets AD from all four, so the key and anchor work. As a control I
>> signed the same zone with next names
>> foo\https://www.google.com/url?q=http://000.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E.
>> and
>> *\https://www.google.com/url?q=http://000.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E.,
>> which are not children. All four then answer NXDOMAIN with AD.
>>
>> Could the WG give erratum 6734 corrected text that stops recommending
>> \000.QNAME as a next name for an NXDOMAIN proof?
>>
>> AI models helped review the text and build small test models; Arxo ran the
>> checks, and I take responsibility for the reports.
>>
>> Rifat Jumagulov
>> Arxo Law · [email protected]
>> _______________________________________________
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--
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: [email protected]
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