Mark,
It seems to me that there are already two matters mixed (messed?) up in
this thread.
In general, the algorithm of finding the lexicographic successor of a
domain name looks as follows:
1) prepend the \000. label
2) if that exceeds max name length, increment the first label instead:
2a) ... by appending the \000 octet at the end
2b) if theat exceeds max name/label length, increment last octet
2c) if (while) last octet is \255, strip it and increment previous one
3) if 2c failed due to all octets being \255, strip the label and
increment next one
4) if all labels stripped down to zone (apex) name, we wrapped around to
the apex
--------
BUT in some cases, 1) can fall into undesirable bailiwick. For example,
if we are proving there is "nothing beneath" some name, it would be
countered by outputting a name that is beneath by the \000. label.
Therefore it is necessary, in some cases, skip step 1) and start at step 2).
And my impression was that the original question was regarding this in
some specific situation.
Libor
On 04. 11. 26 23:31, marka wrote:
On 5 Nov 2026, at 09:29, marka <[email protected]> wrote:
On 5 Nov 2026, at 08:42, Mark Andrews <[email protected]> wrote:
You replace the first label with one that sorts after it as the next name.
Append a 0x00 octet if there is space otherwise increment the last octet by
one. If that overflows remove the last octet and increment the second last
octet. If that overflows remove it and increment the new last octet. Repeat. If
the label is exhausted apply this to the second last label. If it is in the
zone otherwise use the zone origin.
If the octet has the value 0x5a (Z) then you down case the value to 0x7a (z)
and increment to get 0x7b ({).
There is space:
A -> A\000
There was not space and the last character is Z:
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ ->
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz ->
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz{
There was not space and the last character isn't Z:
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZA ->
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZB
There was not space and the last character is 0xff and the second last
character is Z:
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ\255 ->
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ{
do that again
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ\255 ->
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ{
--
Mark Andrews
On 4 Nov 2026, at 23:12, Rifat Jumagulov <[email protected]> wrote:
Hello,
RFC 4470 Section 4 builds the next name this way: "To increment a name, add a leading label with a single null (zero-value)
octet." For https://www.google.com/url?q=http://foo.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E it gives an
NSEC record with next name \https://www.google.com/url?q=http://000.foo.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E,
and it says: "The first of these NSEC RRs proves that no exact match for
https://www.google.com/url?q=http://foo.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E exists"
RFC 8198 Appendix B reads the same form differently: "If the next domain name is a subdomain of the given name, you
have an ENT. Otherwise, you have an NXDOMAIN."
\https://www.google.com/url?q=http://000.foo.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E is a subdomain
of https://www.google.com/url?q=http://foo.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E, so this NSEC
shows an empty non-terminal, not a missing name. Section 3 of RFC 4470 also says: "This change is expected to be fully
compatible with all existing DNSSEC validators."
Erratum 6734 (Reported, Mark Andrews) makes the general point: \000.domain can only prove
no data at domain, not that domain does not exist. It has no corrected text yet. RFC 7129
Appendix A prints the same form, NSEC
\https://www.google.com/url?q=http://000.b.example.org&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E.
Local test: a zone with the two NSEC records of the Section 4 example, signed with ECDSAP256SHA256, served by NSD 4.15.4 and by
Knot DNS 3.6.2, which both return NXDOMAIN with both records. Query
https://www.google.com/url?q=http://foo.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E. A with DO=1. BIND
9.20.30, Unbound 1.24.0, Knot Resolver 6.5.1 and PowerDNS Recursor 5.4.9 all answer SERVFAIL.
https://www.google.com/url?q=http://example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E. SOA gets AD from all four,
so the key and anchor work. As a control I signed the same zone with next names
foo\https://www.google.com/url?q=http://000.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E. and
*\https://www.google.com/url?q=http://000.example.com&source=gmail&ust=1793623136948000&sa=E., which are not
children. All four then answer NXDOMAIN with AD.
Could the WG give erratum 6734 corrected text that stops recommending
\000.QNAME as a next name for an NXDOMAIN proof?
AI models helped review the text and build small test models; Arxo ran the
checks, and I take responsibility for the reports.
Rifat Jumagulov
Arxo Law · [email protected]
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--
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: [email protected]
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