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Date: Wed, 5 Oct 1994 15:56:11 -0400 (EDT)
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Date: Wed, 5 Oct 1994 15:53:40 -0400 (EDT)
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Subject: moral right/wrong
Tj poses the question of how one ought to go about arguing about meat-eating and
suggests that it comes down to fiat. It's that kind of view that I suggested
reminds those of us who teach ethics of an intro course. Here's a strategy
I've found effective: I ask the class how many animals they saw on the way to
class that day [I did this yesterday and it worked perfectly]. The answers
usually range between zero and three [cats, squirrels, dogs, although once a
student said 150! and pointed out she passes a dairy farm]. I then ask them how
many animals there are in the room--the surprised looks on their faces are
worth the try! I then point out that they hadn't thought of themselves as
animals and we discuss it a bit. The second step is to ask them whether they
would want to live in a world in which what I will call "the harm principle" is
not operative. The harm principle [which we refine] says one may not harm
someone [or be harmed] unless one has an overriding reason [initially of a life
or death sort] for doing so. We usually show how self defense in life
threatening cases does not violate the principle. Out of self-regarding reasons
they see the value of the harm principle: it means they cannot be arbitrarily
harmed without the principle being violated. I then point out to them that they
have agreed to an argument for not eating meat, since human beings do not need
to eat meat to survive [i.e., they have no overriding reason]. Thus, the
reasons that show THEY should not be harmed also show it is unreasonable for
them to harm other creatures [here having shown we all belong in the category
"animal" {with refining discussion about the irrelevances of differences in this
category} allows {demands} the extension to non-human animals].
Tj asks who should decide these questions? The answer seems obvious enough:
those creatures capable of understanding the reasons and reasonings involved;
that is, moral agents [who else?]. The point is to begin with the principles
that one wants applied to oneself and then show how much that commits one to.
That's what's meant be calling vegetarianism "reasonable."
Prof. Gadfly
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