Mes excuses par avance pour les doublons.
Le département de philosophie de Philosophie de l’Université de Rennes avec le
CAPHI, et l’Université de Lyon avec le GATE, ainsi que l’ANR ValFree organisent
un colloque étalé sur trois jours.
Thème:
Preferences and autonomy: philosophy and economics
En bref,
Le colloque porte sur la façon dont une approche préférentialiste ou subjective
des intérêts ou du bien-être doit tenir compte des questions d’autonomie, voire
sur des approches alternatives susceptibles de mieux en tenir compte.
(Je joins plus bas un argumentaire plus détaillé.)
Le colloque réunit pour moitié économistes et philosophes et se tiendra à
Rennes.
Il se déroule du 2 au 4 Juin 2022
La langue du colloque est l’anglais
Et vous êtes cordialement invités.
Le colloque se déroule entièrement salle 13
À l'
UFR de Philosophie
Campus de Beaulieu - Bâtiment 32 B
Avenue du Général Leclerc - CS 74205
35065 Rennes CEDEX
Le programme est le suivant:
Thursday, June 2, 2021
14h-15h: Robert Sugden, University of East Anglia
“Autonomy and the model of the inner rational agent”
15h15-16h15: Connie Rosati, University of Texas at Austin
“Autonomy, Preference, and Personal Good”
16h30- 17h30: Muriel Gilardone, Université de Caen
“Capability as ‘effective power’: a normative view of agency”
Friday, June 3, 2021
9h-10h: Steven Wall, University of Arizona
“Autonomy, Welfare and Options”
10h15-11h15: Joao V. Ferreira, University of Southampton
“Which choices merit deference? A comparison of three behavioural proxies of
subjective welfare”
11h30-12h45: Mikael Cozic, Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3
“The Import of Revealed Preference Theory”
Lunch
14h30-15h30: Guilhem Lecouteux, Université Côte d'Azur
“Addicted by design: individual autonomy with preferences under influence”
15h45-16h45: David Enoch, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
“Contrastive Consent and Third Party Coercion”
17h-18h: Antoinette Baujard, Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne
“Preferences and autonomy in deliberation”
Saturday, June 4, 2021
8h30-9h30: Till Grüne-Yanoff, Royal institute of Technology, Stockholm
“The Ethics of Boost”
9h 45-10h45: Erik Schokkaert, UK Leuven
“Respect for preferences and the autonomy of persons with dementia”
11h-12h: Dale Dorsey, Kansas University
“The Quest for an Acceptable Perfectionism”
Les organisateurs,
Stéphane Lemaire et Benoît Tarroux
Pour tout renseignement, vous pouvez écrire à
Sophie Rabaux <sophie.rab...@univ-rennes1.fr>
Ou Stéphane Lemaire
Argumentaire plus détaillé du colloque:
According to a major trend in normative economics, social choices should rely
on what people want, that is, on their preferences. What people want or value
is also at the center stage of what are called in philosophy subjectivist
approaches to well-being. According to such views, an object contributes to an
individual well-being insofar as she or he has a certain type of pro-attitude—
like for instance, a desire— towards it. These subjectivist approaches are
often partly justified by anti-paternalist arguments by normative economists,
and moral and political philosophers.
However, the precise role that autonomy plays in the very
description of what people desire or prefer remains often partly hidden. In
fact, one might use the notion of autonomy in very different ways to describe
what people prefer, or really prefer, or what really matter for them. One
reason for its use is that preferences may be the result of adaptation,
misinformation, incoherence, lack of knowledge, of rationality, of
deliberation, or of available options and all these defects may be understood
in some way as lack of autonomy. Hence, the temptation to formulate subjective
approaches in terms of somehow idealized preferences. On the other hand, any
departure from what people actually desire or even from what they think they
desire may be accused of violating their autonomy understood as respect for
their will, their word, or how they understand themselves.
Such tension is obvious in debates surrounding rational consent. It
is also illustrated in the claim of advocates of nudges who contend to be
liberals insofar as they aim to lead people to choose what they would really
want, though this means organizing the choice framework in order to stir them
away from what they would have actually chosen. More generally, preferences
evolve. This raises questions of intertemporal prudential rationality but also
about the autonomy of these preferences and their possible evolution.
Furthermore, one might wonder if the prudential and autonomy considerations are
coherent or whether they (may) pull in different direction, and why.
These questions raise in turn the question of the nature of
autonomy and whether it can be understood in a preferentialist or subjectivist
account of value or well-being. One possibility is to see autonomy as justified
on external objectivist ground. But the subjectivist has several other options
at her disposal: autonomy may be understood in terms of preferences or in moral
or political terms.
Finally, all these difficulties are factored by the fact that
autonomy is a multifaceted notion. In particular, one needs at least to
distinguish between autonomy as respect for the will of subjects and as
non-alienation. The first is prominent in political contexts where it is
tightly linked to the notion of consent, and thus to the respect due to
people’s word or will. In contrast, autonomy as non-alienation, is more like an
ideal value linked to the notion of an ideal citizen or to a life of one’s own.
The aim of the conference is to explore how the notion of autonomy
should be understood and integrated if it can within a broadly preferentialist
or subjectivist approach to well-being or values and how it contributes to
moral, political and social choices.
Thus, we hope the conference to address questions like the
following (although the list is not limitative):
-Should autonomy under one or its several acceptations shape our description of
actual or ideal preferences?
-If this is correct, how?
-Or should we take this aim as irrelevant for the descriptions of preferences?
-Which role should then play autonomy considerations?
-Can we integrate the various norms of autonomy in one framework?
-Can autonomy itself be understood in preferentialist or subjective terms?
-If not, is it a threat for such approaches?
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