Eric, --- Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a �crit�: > If finding the option most acceptable to the group is of any > importance to a voter, they cannot harm their own interests. A kind > of person for whom this would not be important would be a dictator, > someone involved in the overthrow of the government, etc...or > basically anyone else who is unwilling to submit to the preference of > the group as a whole. > > As such, any method which is capable of finding the group preference > would be one in which it is acceptable to fail Participation.
I understand what you're saying, but there has to be a limit... Basically, we should try to minimize the number of people who might throw a fit and regret the way they voted. Maybe we can't be any more specific than that. It does seem to me that we've met most of what we need in Participation, if we meet weak FBC. There should never be incentive to put B>A somewhere in your ranking if your sentiment is A>B. If that is guaranteed, then the only strategy issue for the voter is when to misrepresent a sincere strict ranking as an equal ranking. (That includes truncation.) I suspect it could be proven that a voter who uses only two ranks (due to equal ranking) in a method which never rewards order reversal, could never worsen the result from his perspective. Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en fran�ais ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
