Eric, --- Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a �crit�: > >I suspect it could be proven that a voter who uses only two ranks (due to > >equal ranking) in a method which never rewards order reversal, could never > >worsen the result from his perspective. > > My intuition would say the same thing. > > (assume the number of candidates > 3) > > However, considering that insincere truncation > will harm the ability for a method to find the > group preference by shifting the decision on how > at least two candidates compare with one another > when that voter did have a sincere preference > between them, suggesting that each voter only > rank two candidates does not appear to be a good > option.
First, that last phrase is not what I was suggesting. I meant that a voter would group all candidates into two groups, not that he would rank two candidates. The value I see in this is that the voter cannot make the result any worse than he has braced himself beforehand to accept. (This is equivalent to the situation in Approval: Your vote can't make someone win whom you didn't approve.) It's not that I would encourage voters to do this, it's that a voter COULD do this if they were concerned about their vote spoiling the result. So what I am saying is that a method should permit this approval-style voting to work. Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en fran�ais ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
