The reason why some want to say that Plurality allows rankng all the candidates is because that's one way to write criteria that will act as expected and intended.
Certain criteria, like the defensive strategy criteria, and the Condorcet Criterion, and some others, need one of the 3 approaches that I'll list here. I'm not saying that there aren't other ways (or that there are).
1. Ridiculous fictious pretense that Plurality & Approval allow ranking all the candidates.
2. Arbitrary rules-requirement that says "I like rank methods, so I decree that only they pass."
3. Mentioning sincere preferences, and sometimes stipulating sincere voting.
The criteria written in those 3 ways are equivalent. One chooses which of those approaches makes the most sense.
The first approach, the ridiculous fiction, simply isn't true.
The second approach makes for an unconvincing criterion. Why do only rank methods pass criteria written in that way? Anyone can write a criterion calling for any kind of rule, and then, guess what, a method having that rule is "better" than other methods, by that criterion. And it doesn' t mean a damn thing.
Only rank methods pass my Condorcet Criterion and the majority defensive strategy criteria, but not by decree. My criteria say nothing about what rules a method should have. Only rank methods pass my CC & majority defensive criteria, for no other reason than because other methods fail to meet those criteria's results requrements. Results requirements that express and speak to voters' and electoral reformers' concerns.
By the way, how would you write FBC as a votes-only criterion?
If you do that, then I'll have to admit that you beat me to it.
Mike Ossipoff
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