Bart,
--- Bart Ingles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a �crit�: >
> I agree that fractional ER-IRV is an inconsequential improvement over
> regular IRV.
>
> I also have serious doubts about whole-vote ER-IRV, mainly over whether
> the Duvergerian equilibria would still be strong enough to maintain a
> two-party system. If so, then the differences between top-two, IRV,
> ER-IRV(fractional), ER-IRV(whole votes), or simply disqualifying all but
> the top-two primary winners from the general election, are largely
> academic, at least in U.S. partisan races.
The difference between ER-IRV(whole) and those other methods is that the
voter can just submit an approval ballot if he wants. ER-IRV(whole) fails
FBC but not, I think, in a very predictable way. Other than this, there is
no incentive to raise compromises above preferred candidates.
If this reasoning doesn't convince you, I'd like to ask what it is about
ER-IRV(whole) that you think would still maintain a two-party system.
Kevin Venzke
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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