I should add that while I don't rate ER-IRV(whole) as highly as straight-up approval voting, I could probably accept it as one of the best possible variants of IRV. That doesn't make it a "good" system, but at least it would introduce people to the concept of equal-ranking. Particularly if only two preference levels are allowed (not counting truncation), since the strategy for filling out 2nd-choice preferences would then be about the same as with approval voting.
This triggers another perverse thought: If I am correct that multiple first-choices are rarely optimal with ER-IRV(whole), then you wouldn't be giving up much by allowing only one first choice in the first place. This might be an easy sell to places like Berkeley, where IRV is mandated but held up due to lack of an approved counting system. They could simply list the candidates twice, with "vote for one first choice" over the top list, and "vote for one or more second choices" over the bottom list. While this would be at best a mediocre system, my guess is that social utility efficiency would be better than with fully-ranked IRV. Bart ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
