For the purpose of my critreria, I have a definition of sincere voting. It doesn't involve ratings. Here I'm using "sincere" with a different meaning. For the purposes of this message, sincere voting means voting that expresses the voter's true ratings to the extent possible with CR balloting or Approval balloting.
Because Approval is a CR method, "sincere voting" means the same in Approval as in CR. There of course are just two point assignments in Approval, and a sincere Approval ballot is considered to be one that gives a point to every above-mean candidate.
By "Approval strategy" I mean Approval's expectation-maximizing strategy, whether used in Approval or CR.
It's important to emphasize that sincere CR voting is possible in Approval too, by voting for the above-mean candidates, and maybe flipping a coin when undecided on a candidate; or by assigning ratings from 0 to 1, and drawing numbers from a bag, as described in my previous posting.
1.Some voters votng sincere CR ratings vs all using Approval strategy
A. When there's no CW, or the CW (as rarely happens) doesn't maximize SU, or Approval strategy
is based on mistaken information:
The fact that some CR voters rate sincerely might increase the SU of the outcome. If there's
a CW, and Approval strategy is based on false information, then sincere rating by some voters
could help the CW win where s/he othewise wouldn't.
B.. When there's a CW who (as is usually the case) maximizes SU,. and Approval strategy is based
on accurate information:
The sincere CR voters could be had by strategizing voters, defeating the CW and reducing the
SU of the outcome.
As I was saying, in our current political system, progressives are basing their strategy on information that's unreliable, and probably false. So, for now, CR is better than Approval, since it encourages the sincere rating that can save a CW from misinformed strategy.
But, after one Approval or CR election, that election's result could inform future strategy so that Approval, which encourages strategy more, would be preferable. Better that everyone use well-informed strategy than that some vote sincerely and let the CW lose to strategists.
If, in the 1st Approval or CR election, Nader outpolls the Republican, then progressives should notice that they needn't vote for the Democrat.
2. Some voters using sincere CR stratgegy vs Condorcet:
A. When there's no CW, or the CW (as rarely happens) doesn't maximize SU:
Then, sincere rating by some CR voters could result in a better SU than that given by Condorcet.
B.. When there's a CW who (as is usually the case) maximizes SU:
Then, Condorcet will maximize SU when it elects the CW, and SU would be less if some
sincere voting in CR elected someone else, by letting the sincere voters be had by
strategists.
I emphasize that these advantages & disadvantages are insignificant compared to the consideration of what is more likelly to be accepted by the public and enacted.
Smith's CR polling gives information that we should have gotten a long time ago. Now someone must do polling about which method people would be more likely to accept: Approval, CR, or Condorcet.
For that purpose, the Condorcet should be PC. Maybe, so as not to ask people for more time than they're willing to give, it would be better to ask each person "Yes or No" on their acceptance of one method, rather than defining all 3 methods for each person and asking them for an opinion on each one. But that could depend on where and whom one is polling.
Mike Ossipoff
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