Russ continued:
Approval, on the other hand, will not necessarily reach a stable equilibrium with only two dominant parties.
I comment:
?With Approval, if there's a party that's always voter-median or CW, there will be a stable equilibrium with _one_ party--the CW or voter median party.
ERuss continued:
If I understand it correctly, it could allow any number of parties to reach a stable state of parity.
I reply:
The party that is always CW or at the voter-median would keep winning at MW equilibrium. Just that one party.
But it's true that Approval would fairly deal with any number of parties. But it wouldn't include them all in a winning equilibrium, nor should it.
If only one party is popular, then obviously that party will dominate. That is true for practically *any* democratic system. And obviously no election method should include any party in a "winning equilibrium" unless that party is popular with the electorate.
The important point is that, under Approval, *more* than *two* parties can compete more or less equally on the basis of the public perception of their *merits*. In other words, no party will face an insurmountable handicap merely because they are not expected to win.
Russ continued:
But I see a potential problem. If several parties reach parity, strategic voting becomes difficult, and the voter could end up with very difficult decisions. Do Greens approve the Democrat as a hedge against the Republican, or do they not? It's the same old problem, except now it's much more complicated.
I comment:
Same old problem, yes. It can be summarized by saying that Approval has strategy to a greater extent than Condorcet does. That's the difference between Approval & Condorcet.
"Except that now it's much more complicated": Much more complicated than what? Than Plurality? It isn't much more complicated, and in fact it isn't more complicated at all, to vote for the candidate that you'd vote for in Plurality and also for those whom you like better, as opposed to just voting in a Plurality election.
That strategy may be useful only for the first election in which Approval Voting is used. After that, it may no longer be useful, depending on the results of that first Approval election. We've already concluded that Approval can support more than two viable parties, but the strategy you stated assumes that two parties are still dominant, as under plurality. If that assumption is true, then Approval hasn't made much of a difference.
It is possible, of course, that the "Republicrats" will still be dominant for a while -- perhaps a long while -- after Approval is instituted. After all, they have massive political "machinery" and muscle. And many voters will favor them for a long time by virtue of sheer inertia and "tradition." In that case, then the strategy of "voting for the candidate that you'd vote for in Plurality and also for those whom you like better" will still work -- but only because Approval hasn't worked as well as hoped by some.
Russ continued:
As a matter of fact, they may need to think about approving the *Republican* to prevent the *Libertartian* from getting elected! Or vice versa.
I comment:
Actually, a genuine libertarian isn't worse than a Republican. A genuine libertarian is the opposite of a Republican on authoritarian issues. But that's a genuine libertarian, as opposed to an authoritarian.
A "genuine" libertarian would immediately stop all welfare payments, aggressively phase out Social Security and Medicare, and end "progressive" taxation to make the poor pay their "fair share" of taxes (under Bush II, the percentage of the "poor" who pay no federal income taxes at all is approaching 40% if I recall correctly).
Is that "better than a Republican," Mike? And while we're at it, would you consider approving the Republican to prevent that libertarian philosophy from being enacted? Just wondering.
Russ continued:
The Approval strategy "formulas" that have been put forth are interesting, but in many cases they will be of no practical use to voters. Why? Because they are based on how other voters are expected to vote, which is obviously uncertain. The best strategic cutoff point could depend critically on that uncertain information, in which case the formulas will be useless as a practical guide for voters.
I comment:
Hardly. The fact that some Approval strategies are based on estimates of who will likely be the top-2 votegetters, or on other probabilities (as opposed to certainties) doesn't lessen its usefulness as a practical guide for voters. Some Approval strategies require more to be estimated than others do. Some require different things to be estimated. Check the recent postings about Approval strategy.
You didn't get my point. My point was that many or most of the strategies might not useful when, for example, several parties have rough parity, and who is really ahead of whom is unclear.
Just because I can write down the dynamic equations for tumbling dice, that does not mean I can use them to throw snake eyes on demand.
Some ways of voting in Approval don't require probabilities to be estimated. Those too are discussed in recent EM postings.
It's obvious that if we only adopt for puiblic elections methods which have been tested by use in public elections, we're pretty much stuck with what is currently used in public elections. That's fine if you like what's currently in use.
Yes, that *is* obvious, which makes me wonder why you said it. I never implied that Approval shouldn't be used because it hasn't been tested extensively in public elections. That lack of testing, however, leads humble people to be cautious. You never know what surprises reality might spring on you.
Anyone arguing that Approval or CR might be worse than the Plurality currently in use would have to explain why Approval's or CR's added freedoms, freedoms that they add to what's allowed in Plurality, would make them worse than Plurality.
Well, yes and no. I think the "burden of proof" should be on the person proposing a radical change to something so fundamental to democracy itself. But the "burden of proof" shouldn't be unreasonably high.
--Russ
When people find they can vote themselves money, that will herald the end of the Republic. --Benjamin Franklin
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