Dear Russ, I interpret Mike Ossipoff's "Strategy-Free Criterion" (SFC) and "Generalized Strategy-Free Criterion" (GSFC) as follows:
"X >> Y" means that a majority of the voters strictly prefers candidate X to candidate Y. SFC: Suppose (1) A >> B and (2) the partial individual rankings can be completed in such a manner that candidate A is a Condorcet candidate. Then candidate B must be elected with zero probability. GSFC: Suppose (1) A >> B and (2) the partial individual rankings can be completed in such a manner that candidate A is in the Schwartz set and candidate B is not in the Schwartz set. Then candidate B must be elected with zero probability. ********* I could ask Mike Ossipoff whether my interpretation of his criteria is correct. But I guess that I won't get an answer. (Maybe Mike fears that he could be nailed. Maybe he fears that the reader observes that his criteria are only relaxations of my majority beatpath criterion of 1997.) Markus Schulze ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
