Dear Russ, I wrote (27 Feb 2005): > I interpret Mike Ossipoff's "Strategy-Free Criterion" (SFC) > and "Generalized Strategy-Free Criterion" (GSFC) as follows: > > "X >> Y" means that a majority of the voters strictly prefers > candidate X to candidate Y. > > SFC: Suppose (1) A >> B and (2) the partial individual > rankings can be completed in such a manner that candidate A > is a Condorcet candidate. Then candidate B must be elected > with zero probability.
You wrote (27 Feb 2005): > In your interpretation of SFC above, I think your supposition 2 > should actually be part of the result. Here is my attempt at it: > > SFC: Suppose A >> B. Then partial individual rankings can be > completed in such a manner that no preferences are reversed > and candidate B must be elected with zero probability. Well, it seems to me that your interpretation does't work when there is a circular tie with A >> B, B >> C, and C >> A. Example: 40 BCA 35 CAB 25 ABC Markus Schulze ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
