James,
> I'm not sure that your example contradicts my general statement, because
> I don't know who the sincere IRV winner was. Maybe A was the sincere IRV
> winner, but all of the B voters truncated. Perhaps I could make my
> statement more tautological as follows:
> __If the sincere IRV winner I differs from the sincere Condorcet winner
> C, and all C>I voters vote strict and sincere rankings, then the I>C
> voters will have an opportunity to give I the victory by using a
> bury-reverse strategy against C.__ (Is this always true? I'm not sure, but
> I think so.)
So, like this perhaps:
40 A>B>C (sincere)
25 B>A>C
35 C>B>A
IRV/FPP/DSC order is A>C>B; CDTT is {b}.
40 A>C>B (insincere)
25 B>A>C
35 C>B>A
IRV/FPP/DSC order is A>C>B; CDTT is {a,b,c}.
Yes, CDTT methods have the same burial problem (and solution) as
WV methods. That's one reason I suggest CDTT,RandomBallot.
> and here's UMID from 7/26/04:
> ...
> >If there is a set such that no candidate within the set is
> >majority-beaten by any candidate outside the set, then it's an
> >inconclusively-dominated set. If it doesn't contain other
> >inconclusively-dominated sets, then it's a minimal
> >inconclusively-dominated set. So the union of minimal
> >inconclusively-dominated sets consists of all the candidates who belong
> >to a minimal inconclusively-dominated set.
>
> That's the same, right?
Yes, and earlier Markus defined the "Smith//Truncation set."
I find your choice of words amusing. By analogy, if no one drops a
bomb on me then I'm "inconclusively-exploded."
Kevin Venzke
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