At 01:17 PM 8/11/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
Regarding the example: 59 people out of 100 prefer B to A. Under the
principle of "one person, one vote", it's extremely difficult to argue
that A should win.
"Should" is undefined.
Giving it a definition, that candidate should win who will best unify the
society electing him or her. This, of course, is only one possible definition.
However, using it, suppose that, yes, 59/100 voters prefer B to A. But the
preference is slight, and those voters, voting Approval "sincerely" (which
is also not clearly defined), might easily approve both B and A. Yes, they
prefer B. Maybe B is taller, or B is blonde, and gentlemen prefer blondes....
And suppose that 41 voters out of 100 so detest B that a serious insurgency
will start if B is elected.
Would you still think that B "should" win?
My point is that context matters. I don't find it difficult at all to argue
that simple expressed preference (which is all that Condorcet considers) is
a primitive criterion and is not always a suitable one.
I do agree that Range Voting has some possible problems with strategic
voting; it is really the same problem as with Approval. What is unclear,
however, is the actual effect that this would have in real elections.
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