--- Steve Eppley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a �crit�: > Clearly B is the "approval" winner, if you interpret > being ranked > over the line as being "approved." (An > interpretation I think should > be avoided, since "approval" is a misleading > absolutist concept and > *relative* preferences are what really matter.
I can appreciate that, but if the divider has no meaning except for its practical/strategic use, I wonder how to explain to people the purpose of the divider. > > I think this is intuitive. Isn't it just a > > consequence of it being impossible to have a cycle > > with an approval ballot? > > I believe so, but I prefer proofs over intuition. Well, I'll trust you. > > > I'm concerned that some voters wouldn't use the > > > dividing line strategically as intended > > > > I also think my method could alleviate some of > your > > concern about the voters using the divider > > efficiently. > > I didn't use the word "efficiently" and am uncertain > what Kevin means > by that here. By "efficiently" I meant "strategically as intended." > That doesn't alleviate my concern. I want them to > rank some > "compromise" candidate(s) over the line (at least in > the scenarios > where no candidate is the top choice of a majority) > and neither your > method nor the family I described force them to do > so. For example, > some Nader voters might rank only Nader over the > line. Right; I want them to rank "compromise" candidates over the line, too. My suspicion is that they'll be more inclined to do so if not ranking a candidate above the line means ranking him equally with everyone else below the line. > > I think the voter should also be allowed to order > the candidates > below the line, so we can use those preferences to > help find the best > compromise. Yes, I think it would be nice (ordering below the line), but if it messes up the voters' use of the divider line, perhaps it can be sacrificed. >(The > underlying goal is > to minimize the coordination costs for a "good" > majority to be able > to ensure the defeat of "evil" candidates. The > assumption is that > sincere ordering is cheapest, downranking evil > candidates is next > cheapest, ranking compromises equal to favorites is > next, and ranking > compromises over favorites is most expensive to > coordinate.) I will think about this. (I hadn't thought of it in that way.) > >Do you think tinkering with the ballot > format is > >completely out? > > I can't begin to answer that last question until > Kevin indicates > which ballot formats he considers "untinkered." I meant tinkered, altered, from what you specified in rule #1 of your method family. Thus my method's ballot is "tinkered" in this context. Yours Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en fran�ais ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com _______________________________________________ Election-methods mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
