Forest, Thanks. It's much clearer to me now how it works.
I suspect that this system (applying a Condorcet method to the ballots) is identical to Borda with a fixed number of ranks. I'd bet that voters would use Approval strategy (give only 15's and 0's). Given a Borda ballot of A>B>C>D>E, the points given are A 4, B 3, C 2, D 1, E 0. If you make a Condorcet matrix reflecting these points, you'll get the same winner: A B C D E A . 1 2 3 4 B 0 . 1 2 3 C 0 0 . 1 2 D 0 0 0 . 1 E 0 0 0 0 . Measuring the degree of preference essentially means letting this voter vote four times for the A>E proposition. The value of mere relative ranking is diluted. I'm not sure this can be overcome. --- Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a �crit�: > > > 12: A at 10 (fill 8 and 2 circles) > > 11: B at 7 (fill 4, 2, 1) > The wise course for all voters is to vote at least > one candidate at 15 and > at least one candidate at zero, so these two > factions seem to be throwing > caution to the wind in order to express their > beliefs that neither > candidate is very good. Yes, but my intention was to see what happens when the individual bits have different winners. I see now from your explanation that it doesn't matter because they're not compared that way. Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en fran�ais ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com _______________________________________________ Election-methods mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
