Let's see, this method is non-dictatorial, because all voters are equal. It's Pareto efficient, because if every single voter prefers the status quo to a certain candidate then that other guy can't win, and if every voter prefers a newcomer to the status quo then status quo can't win.
Are you sure it's strategy-free? Forest Simmons said: > Here's a strategy free method that will work in certain situations: > > The main requirement is that there has to be an incumbent or status > quo option. > > The voters indicate which candidates they prefer over the status quo. > If the status quo is the Condorcet Winner (i.e. no alternative is > preferred over the status quo) then the incumbent/status quo stays in > for another term of office. Otherwise, the candidate that is > preferred over the status quo by the greatest number of voters is > elected. > > Basically, this is Approval, with the Minimum Acceptable Virtual > Candidate (aka the None of the Below approval cutoff) replaced by the > incumbent. > > You might say that pitting the incumbent against all comers is unfair > to the incumbent. In fact neutrality is violated. > > But this may be an appropriate balance on the inherent advantage of > incumbents who tend to use their political clout to set things up in > their favor. > > [Of course, it could backfire by encouraging even more of that sort of > thing.] > > Note that in a three way cycle of preference where majorities prefer A > to B to C to A, if those preferences persisted over time, the winners > would cycle from one election to another, yielding a form of temporal > PR. > > Forest > > _______________________________________________ > Election-methods mailing list > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com _______________________________________________ Election-methods mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
