Forest Simmons said: > You're right, but like approval it does satisfy the FBC.
Say that the status quo, A, is my favorite, but he loses to candidates B and C. His most overwhelming defeat is at the hands of C, my least favorite. I can't do anything more to help A defeat B and C pairwise, but I can at least try to give B a stronger victory over A. Example: 40 A>B>C 5 C>A>B 25 B>C>A 30 C>B>A B beats A 55:45 C beats A 60:40 The issue of margins vs. winning votes is irrelevant in this example, as C has the strongest victory over A by either measure. C wins. The people in the A>B>C faction have an incentive to vote B>A>C to improve B's victory over A and hence elect B instead of C. Now add the possibility of equal rankings, and margins vs. winning votes matters: If 11 people in the A>B>C faction instead rank A=B>C, we have: B beats A 55:34 C beats A 60:40 With winning votes, B's victory is still the weaker one (55 vs. 60). With margins, B's victory is the stronger one (21 vs. 20). OK, I guess it does pass the weak FBC if we use margins. (Note: Since margins vs. winning votes can be a touchy issue on this list, I am not issuing an across-the-board opinion on that matter, but merely observing that in one particular case margins enables a particular method to satisfy a certain property.) Still, this satisfaction of weak FBC comes at the expense of neutrality. Oh, well, it's an interesting example from a theoretical standpoint. I guess there is more than one ranked method that satisfies weak FBC (I thought "top 2 voting" was the only ranked method to satisfy FBC). Alex _______________________________________________ Election-methods mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
