*** Democracies Online Newswire - http://www.e-democracy.org/do *** Below is the table of contents and text of the Executive Summary: http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/ivote/ (Thank you Kim Alexander and Marc Strassman for notices on the report. Also if anyone who receives this message is involved with White House/National Science Foundation efforts to study online voting at the national level, please join the Democracies Online Newswire <http://www.e-democracy.org/do> and keep our 950+ subscribers informed of your progress <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>. - SLC) California Internet Voting Task Force January 18, 2000 The California Internet Voting Task Force was convened by Secretary of State Bill Jones to study the feasibility of using the Internet to conduct elections in California. More than two dozen experts in the field of data security, elections and voter participation were asked to volunteer their time and expertise in the development of this report. The recommendations, analysis and suggested technical requirements that follow represent the collective opinion of the task force. Final Report Online Executive Summary Opinion of the Task Force Major Findings and Recommendations Definitions of Internet Voting Evolution of Internet Voting Internet Voting Process Technical Issues State and Federal Election Laws Impact on County Election Officials Public Acceptance Task Force Composition Regular Task Force Members Introduction What is Internet Voting Brief History of Voting Systems Task Force Findings Comprehensive vs. Incremental Approaches to Internet Voting Model of a Remote Internet Voting System Implementation of Internet Voting Four Stages of Internet Voting Task Force Findings and Recommendations on Policy Issues Additional Convenience to Voters May Help Improve Participation Voter Accessibility to the Internet Internet vs. Paper Ballot Voters Procedural Differences Between Precinct, Paper Absentee Internet Voting Appendix A Online Technical Committee Recommendations Online 1.Scope of the Technical Committee Report 2.General conclusions of the Technical Committee 3.Internet voter registration 4.Internet Petition Signing 5.Internet Voting 6.Security in i-voting 7.Internet voter education and support 8.General Requirements for i-voting systems 9.Requirements for the Vote Server Data Center (VSDC) 10.Requirements for the Internet Voting Process 11.Glossary Appendix B Online Public Policy Institute of California Statewide Survey: Californians and Their Government, December 1999 Downloads Final Report (not including Appendix A) - Online HTML (98k) | Word Doc (932k) | Adobe PDF (146k) Appendix A - Online HTML (145k) | Word Doc (330k) | Adobe PDF (664k) Final Report and Appendix A in Word format (zipped to 260k) FULL TEXT OF EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ONLY: California Internet Voting Task Force A Report on the Feasibility of Internet Voting January, 2000 Internet Voting Report Executive Summary The California Internet Voting Task Force was convened by Secretary of State Bill Jones to study the feasibility of using the Internet to conduct elections in California. More than two dozen experts in the field of data security, elections and voter participation were asked to volunteer their time and expertise in the development of this report. The recommendations, analysis and suggested technical requirements that follow represent the collective opinion of the task force. Opinion of the Task Force The implementation of Internet voting would allow increased access to the voting process for millions of potential voters who do not regularly participate in our elections. However, technological threats to the security, integrity and secrecy of Internet ballots are significant. The possibility of "Virus" and "Trojan Horse" software attacks on home and office computers used for voting is very real and, although they are preventable, could result in a number of problems ranging from a denial of service to the submission of electronically altered ballots. Despite these challenges, it is technologically possible to utilize the Internet to develop an additional method of voting that would be at least as secure from vote-tampering as the current absentee ballot process in California. At this time, it would not be legally, practically or fiscally feasible to develop a comprehensive remote Internet voting system that would completely replace the current paper process used for voter registration, voting, and the collection of initiative, referendum and recall petition signatures. To achieve the goal of providing voters with the opportunity to cast their ballots at any time from any place via the Internet, this task force believes that the elections process would be best served by a strategy of evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. This report defines four distinct Internet voting models and the corresponding technical and design requirements that must be met when implementing any of the stages. One of the most difficult tasks for an Internet voting system is the authentication of voters. To ensure that every voter has the opportunity to cast a ballot and no voter is able to vote more than one time, this task force believes election officials should initially test Internet Voting technology through the use of Internet Voting machines that are under the direct control of election personnel in traditional polling places. Eventually, election officials can transition toward allowing voters to cast ballots at publicly accessible county- controlled kiosks or computers and, in the future, provide the option of remote computer voting from any computer with Internet access. If remote Internet voting is eventually adopted, this task force believes that current technology requires that it initially be modeled on the current absentee ballot process in California. Although the procedures used to request an Internet ballot in this model would be more cumbersome than traditional e-commerce transactions, it is the only way to tie the authentication of voters from the existing paper voter registration system to the electronic arena at this time. We believe that additional technical innovations are necessary before remote Internet voting can be widely implemented as a useful tool to improve participation in the elections process in California. However, current technology would allow for the implementation of new voting systems that would allow voters to cast a ballot over the Internet from a computer at any one of a number of county-controlled polling places in a county. As with most computer systems, increased security and higher levels of privacy can be provided by increasing the complexity and the burden on the user of the system. The success or failure of Internet voting in the near-term may well depend on the ability of computer programmers and election officials to design a system where the burden of the additional duties placed on voters does not outweigh the benefits derived from the increased flexibility provided by the Internet voting system. The democratic process warrants an extremely high level of security, but the security measures can not be so cumbersome to voters that the new process would prevent participation. An appropriate balance between security, accessibility and ease of use must be achieved before Internet voting systems should be deployed. Major Findings and Recommendations Definitions of Internet Voting For the purposes of this report, an Internet Voting System is defined as an election system that uses electronic ballots that would allow voters to transmit their voted ballot to election officials over the Internet. Internet Voting means the casting of a secure and secret electronic ballot that is transmitted to election officials using the Internet. An Internet Voting Machine is defined as the computer hardware that allows an electronic ballot to be cast over the Internet. Polling Place Internet Voting is defined as the use of Internet Voting Machines at traditional polling places staffed by election officials who assist in the authentication of voters before ballots are cast. Remote Internet Voting means the unsupervised use of an Internet Voting Machine to cast a ballot over the Internet using a computer not necessarily owned and operated by election personnel. Authentication of the voter would rely on procedures outlined later in this report, but must include some form of identity verification that is at least as secure as existing voting procedures. Evolution of Internet Voting The implementation of Internet Voting will be a complex undertaking with no room for error. This task force recommends a phased-in approach to developing an Internet Voting System that will allow election officials and voters the opportunity to identify any possible problems before they occur. Phase One of the task force�s recommendation would provide for the use of Internet Voting technology in a supervised setting like a traditional polling place. In this phase, voters would not yet gain the advantage of voting from any place at any time, but the integrity of the voting and tabulation technology will be verified through the use of Internet Voting Machines. Phase Two of the task force�s recommendation would allow voters to cast Remote Internet Ballots. The authentication of voter identity would take place with a combination of manual and electronic procedures that would provide at least the same level of security as the existing voting process. Internet Voting Process For the foreseeable future, Internet Voting should be viewed only as a supplement to, not a replacement of, traditional paper-based voting. The design of any Internet voting system must be at least as secure against fraud as the current absentee ballot process in every respect. All election activities stem from voter registration which is a paper-based system maintained locally by 58 county election offices. Until digital signatures and digital identification are a common aspect of everyday life for all Californians, on-line registration and the eventual collection of on-line petition signatures for initiative, referendum and recall campaigns should not be made available. Until the voter registration rolls contain a digital signature or biometric identification for all registered voters, requests for Remote Internet ballots must be made on paper with a manual signature that can be compared against the manual signature on the voter�s registration card. Voters will be provided a digital signature for voting purposes once the manual signature on the Internet ballot request and the paper voter registration card are verified. Internet voting systems must be designed to protect the secrecy of the ballot, while providing election officials with an audit trail that can be used to conduct recounts of election results. Technical Issues Potential criminal electronic attacks on computer software, such as destructive "viruses" or "Trojan Horse" software, create a serious threat to Internet voting. To minimize the potential technological threats to Internet voting, election officials should provide unique operating system and web browser software to voters. To achieve the required level of security for a remote Internet ballot, voters will be required to take several precautionary steps before voting. For remote Internet voting to be successful, the burden of the additional duties placed on voters must not outweigh the benefits to be derived from the increased flexibility provided by an Internet voting system. Ballot integrity and secrecy can be protected while ballots are transmitted over the Internet through the use of digital signature and encryption technology. All identifying information used to electronically verify the identity of a voter shall be stripped from the ballot prior to the tabulation of the votes to ensure the secrecy of all Internet ballots. Although the voter�s ballot will be protected from alteration or infringement of privacy as it travels over the Internet, the ballots of voters who access the Internet through a local area network may have their privacy breached by a network administrator who can access the voter�s computer while the ballot is in an unencrypted state. To prevent a breach of privacy, voters must be warned of this potential problem and substantial penalties must be imposed on network administrators who attempt to violate a voter�s privacy. State and Federal Election Laws Several state and federal laws mandate equal access to the voting process and restrict state and local authority regarding the implementation of new election laws. Care must be taken to ensure that Internet voting applications are accessible to all voters. Internet Voting opportunities must be accessible to all voters, including low income voters whose only access to the Internet may be through public access Internet terminals that are commonly available in libraries and schools. Internet ballots must be available in multiple languages in jurisdictions required to print multi-language ballots to conform to the Federal Voting Rights Act. Impact on County Election Officials County election officials would require significant fiscal and human resources to undertake the implementation of either polling place or remote Internet Voting Systems. Just as county officials are currently required to ensure each voter�s paper ballot is configured properly, they would have the additional burden of simultaneously ensuring proper ballot configuration on the electronic system. County officials would need to ensure that their paper and Internet voting systems are properly integrated to ensure proper tabulation of ballots from both systems. Voters will receive the information they need to cast and encrypt their Internet ballot from county election officials. County officials will be responsible for comparing signatures on Internet ballot request forms with each voter�s signature on their voter registration card. If the signature on the ballot request form is verified, the county would then be responsible for providing the voter with an electronic identifier that will be used for authentication over the Internet. Counties will need trained technical personnel to assist with the implementation of Internet Voting Systems for each election. Public Acceptance Recent public opinion polls show that support for Internet Voting is strongest among those members of the public who have the greatest access to and familiarity with the Internet. Younger voters and voters in the western region of the United States have a higher degree of Internet proficiency and a higher degree of support for Internet Voting at this time. The plausibility and popularity of Internet voting is likely to rise over time as public access to and use of the Internet approaches the levels of home telephone and television usage. The level of public support for Internet voting must be measured in terms of all potential voters, not just the universe of voters who are likely to utilize this form of voting. If Internet voting is viewed skeptically by a large number of voters, then the fundamental trust in the democratic process may be compromised. For the full report see: http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/ivote/
