David Catchpole wrote: > Votes: > > 3 A>B>C > 2 B>A>C > 4 C>A>B > > Using plurality, C wins. If we assume that voters have rankings, _whether > or not they can express them on their ballots_, then plurality fails a > Condorcet criterion. But, in the above case, the B>A>C voters 'should' vote strategically for A, and this means that A will win, so the sincere Condorcet winner should win. I'm missing something here, aren't I? ;-)
- [EM] Guarding the Instant Runoff movement ... Instant Runoff Voting supporter
- Re: [EM] Guarding the Instant Runoff ... mike dillon
- Re: [EM] Guarding the Instant Runoff ... Markus Schulze
- Re: [EM] Guarding the Instant Runoff ... MIKE OSSIPOFF
- Re: [EM] Guarding the Instant Runoff ... MIKE OSSIPOFF
- Re: [EM] Guarding the Instant Runoff ... Markus Schulze
- Re: [EM] Condorcet Criterion for ... Martin Harper
- Re: [EM] Condorcet Criterion ... David Catchpole
- Re: [EM] Condorcet Criter... Martin Harper
- Re: [EM] Condorcet C... David Catchpole
- Re: [EM] Condorcet Criter... Bart Ingles
- Re: [EM] Condorcet C... David Catchpole
- Re: [EM] Condorc... Bart Ingles
- Re: [EM] Guarding the Instant Run... Bart Ingles
- Re: [EM] Guarding the Instant Runoff ... MIKE OSSIPOFF
