Here's how I'd define a stronger UUCC. Since this is new, I don't guarantee that it won't turn out to requre touching up. On the other hand, I expect it to be right as-is: UUCC2: It should never be possible to contrive a configuration of candidates, voters, voters' sincere ratings, and voters' actual votes, with which Bc wins and there's some group of 1 or more voters for whom: 1) They're ballots all vote Bc over B; & 2) There's no way in which they could all change their ballots so as to no longer vote Bc over B without causing the election of someone whom they all like less than Bc. [end of definition] Stronger & weaker criteria are useful because they distinguish between different sets of methods. So UUCC & UUCC2 could both be useful. UUCC, being the weaker of the two, is the more embarrassing to fail. The 3 worst methods fail that weaker criterion. Blake has shown that Condorcet, Schulze, & Tideman(m) fail the stronger UUCC2. UUCC2 may turn out to be another exclusive criterion compliance of Approval. Since it hasn't been shown yet how Condorcet, Schulze & Tideman(m) do by UUCC, that too may turn out to be an exclusive Approval compliance, or it may be that one or more pairwise-count methods passes UUCC. Mike Ossipoff _________________________________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com. Share information about yourself, create your own public profile at http://profiles.msn.com.
