Mr. Carey wrote- Mike Ossipoff has been writing about reducing/minimizing the "need for insincerity". I request that the "need for insincerity" numbers be stated. The moment they are defined, there could be a simple minimizing of the need for insincerity quantities over all the finite number of different sets of possible winners. Imaginably some highly unsatisfactory preferential voting method would be found but I guess that Mike Ossipoff can't estimate what the need for insincerity is. I reply: There are several degrees of insincerity: order-reversal, insincere equal ranking of candidates for whom one votes, and truncation. Feel free to number those degrees of sincerity if you want to rate insincerity numerically. As I said in my posting, there are various degrees of limiting to whom the protection applies. FBC protects eveyone. SARC protects all who vote undominated strategies--which means everyone. WDSC & SDSC protect the majority who prefer A to B, as regards what it takes to defeat B. SFC & GSFC have a similar limitation, but also stipulate that there's no falsification of preferences, no voting of unfelt preferences. Additionallly, SFC only applies when there's a sincere CW. You'd like to compare the effectiveness of completely different criteria in reducing insincerity need, numerically. For instance, someone could ask counts as more: Approval's FBC & SARC compliance, or Tideman(wv)'s SDSC, SFC, & GSFC compliance. I wouldn't know how to assign numbers to try to answer that numerically. It's my personal impression that SFC & GSFC are very powerful because complying methods can be completely strategy free for some voters under some plausible conditions. But that's only an impression, and I don't have a quantitative approach to comparing effectiveness of completely different criteria. Mike Ossipoff ---- D- In the single winner case, the sincere/ insincere situation happens when there is (guess what)- a divided majority. Polls before the election show *roughly* a *sincere* possible vote of 26 ABC 25 BAC 49 C[A=B] Some of the C voters may want to be insincere and rank A > B or B > A. Some of the first choice A and B voters may then want to be insincere. Not so amazing. I say so what. Majority rule is majority rule. My standard mantra- an election method works on the votes cast (not added or removed votes -- unless some major felonies are being committed). To get ONLY *sincere* votes would require something like lie detectors connected to the (now no longer secret) ballots. No thanks. _________________________________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com. Share information about yourself, create your own public profile at http://profiles.msn.com.
