Here is an example to show why voters would truncate, if
a Condorcet Criterion Method is used:
Case 1:
47 voters vote ABC.
10 voters vote BAC.
8 voters vote BCA.
35 voters vote CBA.
A:B=47:53.
A:C=57:43.
B:C=65:35.
B wins against A and against C in the pairwise comparison. Thus B
is the Condorcet winner.
Case 2:
Now the 47 voters, who prefer A most, do truncate.
47 voters vote A.
10 voters vote BAC.
8 voters vote BCA.
35 voters vote CBA.
A:B=47:53.
A:C=57:43.
B:C=18:35.
Now there is a tie between A, B, and C. Whether A is elected,
depends on the used tie breaker. But if Condorcet/Smith is
used, then A is elected.
I believe, that to every tie breaker method it is possible to
create an example, where truncation makes sense.
Markus Schulze ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
