Sorry for the tardy response, but I did enjoy my vacation.
My interpretation (version?) of Condorcet is that one should count
the 'plurality': the votes for minus the votes against. Hence
Blake's randomising strategy should not change the result. In his
example, C beats B by 6 votes in both cases.
Blake's method could 'backfire' if the votes do not exactly match.
Cheers.
> Date: Fri, 07 Aug 1998 23:28:54 -0700
> From: "Blake Cretney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> On Fri, 7 Aug 1998 04:00:54 Mike Ositoff wrote:
> >On Thu, 6 Aug 1998, Blake Cretney wrote:
> >
> >> Why would anyone ever sincerely truncate a ballot under
> >> Condorcet? <SNIP>
> What about this example?
>
> 24 A B C \ Sincere preference A > B=C
> 24 A C B /
> 23 B A C
> 29 C B A
>
> The A 1st voters took my advice and marked the other
> candidates randomly instead of truncating. They came
> out even.
>
> A B C
> A X 48 71
> B 52 X 47
> C 29 53 X
>
> Max loss
> 52 53 71
> A wins
>
> Now here's what happens if they vote sincerely and
> truncate
>
> 48 A
> 23 B A C
> 29 C B A
> A B C
> A X 48 71
> B 52 X 23
> C 29 29 X
>
> Max loss
> 52 48 71
> B wins
>
> So unless I've made some kind of error here, it can
> sometimes hurt to use truncation instead of my random
> fill strategy.
>
> The question is, is there any situation where this can
> backfire? That would give a reason not to always use
> my random fill strategy.
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Sorry folks, but apparently I have to do this. :-(
The views expressed above are entirely those of the writer
and do not represent the views, policy or understanding of
any other person or official body.
