I reply to Craig Layton later on. On Sun, 11 Feb 2001 15:47:20 -0800 Bart Ingles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote (referring to the arguments I previously made) > I don't see how these problems are exclusive to locality, vs. any other > grouping used as a basis for representation (including ethnic minority > and even party membership). Well, I certainly wouldn't recommend representation on the basis of ethnicity. That would be even worse. I'm not aware of any country that uses "party membership." That would suggest that non-party members wouldn't even get a vote (or would vote in some "independent" grouping). > It's just part of the nature of > representation that a representative should try to get the best deal > possible for his/her constituency. Of course representatives have a > dual responsibility, the other half of which is to represent society as > a whole (as is spelled out in the oath of office for U.S. politicians). It's a trivial point, but I don't see anything in the oath office about representing society as a whole. Not that I'm claiming that it should, or that this would solve the problem. > I think all of this would be true even if the constituency were > self-selecting, as in districtless STV. Many of my points would clearly not apply in a districtless system. For example, Cabinet Ministers would have no districts to spend extra money in. However, it is true that even in a districtless system, candidates have reason to help those who support them. In reality, by helping their ideology, candidates will likely believe they are helping society as a whole, because this is what every ideology claims. However, I don't agree with you that that is equivalent to a system where every member tries to get clauses in each bill to help his district, or where the executive attempts to locate benefits on the basis of strategy. -------------------------------------- On Mon, 12 Feb 2001 09:56:28 +1100 LAYTON Craig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >One point you mention is "locality of representation." > >Leaving aside the issues of proportionality, and list vs. > >individual systems, I would argue that locality of > >representation is actually a bad thing, and it certainly > >doesn't make sense to compromise some other standard in > >pursuit of it. > > > >You may have some justification for locality. I can't > >recall ever having read someone directly defend the > >principle. People usually just assume that it is a good > >thing. However, on the surface it isn't obvious why we > >should be representing people on the basis of geography. > > In Australia, and I assume all Westminster-based systems (you can correct me > if I'm wrong), the local member performs an important purpose - "making > representations" on behalf of constituents in their dealings with government > bureaucracy. If there weren't local members, I'm sure that some alternative > could be found, but it works really well. Despite party solidarity, local > members will still pressure ministers from their own party for a response if > your grievance appears serious and founded. This is likely to be even more > effective if you have a number of local representatives, so that you can go > to one of the same party as yourself, and there is an extremely good chance > that your first or second choice is holding office. One problem that you imply is that local government members will have much better recourse to the Ministers than will opposition. Also, it isn't clear that districts in themselves are particularly useful, as long as the candidates are reasonably distributed, it doesn't matter that there isn't one for each arbitrarily constructed district. There are other deeper problems, however. There is a natural conflict between the roles of district representative and cabinet minister (or even district representative and legislator). As well, I see the interest in case work for MP's to be symptomatic of the fact that they do not act as legislators in the Westminster model. Because they aren't busy considering the merits of legislation, or who should hold offices, some work has to be found for them. It seems that what they often end up doing is helping their constituents deal with the bureaucracy. Often this is likely beneficial. Often, it seems to involve helping friends or contributors cut through red tape, or jump various queues. Usually, it would be better to improve the bureaucracy than to provide a small number of people to assist with its absurdity. But, the thing I want you to consider is that most of the reforms suggested on this list are intended (or would have the effect) of giving representatives much more power and independence. It seems that the goal is to put them much more in the role of legislators. But this will tend to exclude case work, just as a matter of time constraint. Of course, you could appoint (or even elect) civil servants to fulfill this case-work role. However, I doubt this is a popular enough activity that the public would be willing to pay for it. > But, as I pointed out, there could be an alternative to this process. What > there is no alternative for, is putting candidate election into the hands of > the voters. Of course, it is possible that districtlessness is incompatible with some otherwise desirable standards. My original point was only that geographic representation shouldn't be listed or considered as a desirable property in and of itself. Of course, districts makes non-list systems feasible for large numbers of candidates. > It is an unevoidable consequence of party list systems that the > parties basically decide who will hold office before the election. In > reality, only a handful of seats are ever contested (you would know, for > instance, that the first 40 republicans on the ticket and the first 40 > democrats were going to be elected). Let's say my uncle has voted conservative in every election for the last 40 years. I guess that it is extremely unlikely that he will ever not vote conservative. His vote is predictable. However, this doesn't mean that it isn't his free choice. Similarly, even if we can predict that 40% will always vote Republican, it is still the choice of that 40% to vote Republican. So, they are still the ones who decide that those Republicans get elected. > Despite the fact that you can design list systems to allow people to > distinguish between candidates of the same party, in practice voters do not > take this option. If you have a free list system, which makes the best > attempt of the list systems to give voters a choice, the result will be > determined by a small handful of voters, which will either be from a strong > minority faction, able to instruct it's supporters in detail how to vote, or > by only the most educated voters, again disenfranchising poorer, working > class voters. Are you claiming that less educated voters will vote meaningfully between the candidates of one party in STV, but will not in an open list method? You seem to acknowledge that a large number will vote randomly between party members in STV. As far as I'm concerned, if voters are unwilling or unable to choose between candidates, this suggests that a simple closed list should be presented during the general election. The list to be presented could be chosen by a primary of party members (to avoid it being simply the preference of the infamous "party bosses"). I think it's obvious that a simple system is better for the uneducated. If parties are distinguishable based on their ideology, and their track record, then no vote can be more powerful than a vote for a party. This is why I don't think that less educated voters would be disenfranchised. It seems to me that it is much worse to have a personality based election, where the candidates have limited records, and it is unclear where they stand on basic issues. This seems to be the kind of election they have in the States. This is far worse for the uneducated. In a pure list system, voters are expected to judge which party best represents them, based at least in part, on the candidates it proposes. Because the list is fixed, voters have the whole election to get a feel for what its candidates are like. In an open list or STV, there is no known entity corresponding to the closed list, except the individual members in the district. So, anyone who doesn't properly become aware of the individual candidates in their district, is better served by a closed list. Also, consider the McDonald's effect. Why are franchises so successful? Is it because there products are better? I would argue that it is primarily because of cost effective advertising. It is simply much easier for McDonald's to establish brand recognition nationally than it would be for each individual restaurant to get the same level of brand recognition in its area. The same is true for political parties vs. individual politicians. So, we can expect that an American style personality election will require more money than a list election. Increasing the importance of money in politics certainly doesn't help the working class. --- Blake Cretney
