Markus Schulze wrote:
> Dear Forest,
>
> you wrote (16 May 2001):
>
>> Markus doesn't consider Approval Condorcet Maximum Approval (ACMA) to be
>> a true Condorcet method because it requires more information than the
>> other Condorcet methods do, namely the Yes/No approval information or the
>> ranking of an (extra) virtual reference candidate MAC (Minimum Acceptable
>> Candidate).
>
>
> Nope! To prove that the consistency criterion and the Condorcet criterion
> are incompatible it is not necessary to presume that the winner of the used
> election method depends only on the relative rankings of the voters. The
> proof is valid for every election method that meets the Condorcet criterion.
ACMA doesn't pass the Condorcet criterion, of course... ;-)
