Randy Kunkee posted some comments on statements regarding IRV at the website at http://www.electionmethods.org I'm not the website owner, but I participate in the website. I'll reply here to some of Randy's statements. I'll also forward Randy's letter to the website's owner, who may reply when he has time, if he considers the comments worth replying to. I tend to have lower standards regarding what deserves a reply, hence my reply to this message. Actually I don't waste time on replying fully to long letters by IRVies, but I'll make an exception this time. But if Randy posts a long reply to this, I won't reply, and that _won't_\ mean that Randy has said something irrefutable. It will just mean that I don't waste time on IRVies. Randy Kunkee wrote: The page referenced above makes several vague, unsubstantiated arguments. The claim that IRV votes cannot be summed is flat out wrong. I reply: Perhaps Randy didn't read Russ's definition of summability. Maybe Randy's talking here about precincts sending in sums of how many people voted each of the more than N! possible rankings. I answer about that lower in the letter when Randy brings that subject up. Randy continues: The phraseology is deceptive (it is your web page, you are welcome to do that). For example, take the sentence IRV therefore seems to allow supporters of minor parties to cast protest votes without ``wasting'' their votes. In my view, there is no "seeming" about it I reply: Thank you. But stating that, in your view, things are different isn't what we call a refuting argument. In IRV, sincere voters will often regret that they didn't insincerely vote a lower choice over their favorite. That will happen when someone even worse wins because the lower choice compromise is eliminated before your traveling vote reaches him/her. Randy continues: You go on to state: This advantage is illusory, however, because it applies only as long as those minor parties are sure to lose The advantage is not illusory. If an Al Gore is campaigning and knows that getting the Nader votes in round 2 will win him the election, then he will try to appeal to them. Likewise, a George Bush would realize that he has to moderate his position because he knows he's not really in the majority to start with I reply: We said that in IRV, the voter's confidence that it's safe to vote sincerely is illusory unless Favorite is a sure loser. It isn't quite clear why you think that your comments above refute our statement. If you vote 1Nader, 2Gore, and Gore gets eliminated first, and Bush wins, then any confidence that you had in the safety of sincere voting in IRV was misguided. IRV is not perfect. But I will argue that at its worst, it is no worse than our current plurality system Oh that's reassuring :-) Aside from that, IRV is notorious for its failure of the Monotonicity Criterion. Even Plurality doesn't fail that one. Randy continues: , and at its best, it is a great improvement. I reply: But not in the ways that are considered worthwhile by people who study voting systems. Randy continues: In particular, I agree that IRV can have a certain kind of plurality-like affect in regards to eliminating the bottom candidate, when Condorcet might actually keep such a candidate in. I reply: That's been amply discussed here. Your designation "bottom candidate" for the candidate who has the fewest 1st choice positions suggests that 1st choice vote totals is your standard. Isn't the candidate with the most 1st choice vote positions the "top candidate"? Then isn't that whom you'd want to elect? Randy continues: However, in a country that currently accepts plurailty and a President who got less than 50% of the votes cast, I doubt that's really a big problem. I reply: We accept that so well that half of us refuse to vote. Randy continues: Your consideration of what happens if a 3rd party actually gets strong enough to win is an interesting and valuable inquiry: [...] So far so good. You go on: But what if the Republican is eliminated before the Libertarian? Unless all the Republican votes transfer to the Libertarian, which is extremely unlikely, the Democrat might then beat the Libertarian. If so, I will have helped the Democrat win by not strategically ranking the Republican first. But that's the same situation I'm in now if I vote my true preference for the Libertarian! No. The Republican lost. That's all. I reply: Sure, just like if you vote for Nader, the Democrat might lose to the Republican, that's all. That may be all, but many consider it undesirable enough so that they dump their favorite in order to support a disliked 2nd choice. Randy continues: If the people who vote Republican don't cast 2nd rank votes for Libertarian, then they don't want a Libertarian. By inference they either don't care, or might prefer a Democrat to a Libertarian. I reply. Sure. So what? The Republicans & Democrats are so similar that it would be surprising if they didn't recommend eachother as 2nd choice. Randy continues: The Republican lost. If those Libs. don't get enough votes transfered in to win, the Democrat wins, and that is a correct result. I reply: Certainly, in terms of IRV's rules. Sure, you IRVies tend to use your method as the standard by which you justify your method. Randy continues: I agree that you could consider that you must strategicly vote for the Republicans, lest they not make it to the final round. But I would argue still that it not your fault they lost, but the fault of those who ranked Republicans #1 to not put a #2 vote to the Libertarians, which they have the power to do. I reply: Why should the Republicans be at fault for not ranking the Libs 2nd if they don't consider the Libs their 2nd choice?? It's true that if Compromise loses to Worst in Plurality or IRV, we can blame that on the people who voted for Worst--they made Worst win. But that reassurance doesn't keep people from abandoning their favorite to help a lesser-evil. You say it isn't their fault if their greater evil wins, but that doesn't relieve their perceived need to insincerely vote a lesser-evil in 1st place. Randy continues: You assume, however, that Republica would not vote Libertarian as their 2nd choice, and there are two problems I have with that. I say first of all that if they don't, it is their right and a conscious choice. I reply: Why do you have a problem with the fact that the Republicans have a right to not vote the Libertarian in 2nd choice? You should have a problem with a system that _didn't_ allow people to vote as they want to. Randy continues: Secondly, you are applying old thinking to an environment where a 3rd party is actually competetive with the major parties. If a 3rd party is really that competetive, then everybody's going to know it, and it will make that #2 rank and #3 rank etc. all the more important to mark. I reply: Why is it a problem to you that people will consider it important to mark their 2nd & 3rd choices? Randy continues: (As an aside, there is no reason to believe that a conservative Republican would vote #2 for a Libertarian I reply: Thank you, Randy, we knew that. If they all did, then you'd have the fortuitous "mutual majority" situation, and IRV wouldn't embarrass you. Randy continues: You refer to Australia as still having a 2 party system, and in the same paragraph suggest that IRV will "wreak havoc" on our political landscape. I reply: Are you suggesting that thoses statements are mutually contradictory? People who talk about IRV's "track record" should know that IRV, like Plurality, has maintained a 2-party system. And it was initially hoped that IRV would encourage parties to run more than 1 candidate. No such luck. Probably the havoc referred to was a disastrous election of an extremist, something that will of course often happen with IRV, under sincere voting. When that happens, people will know to not repeat that sincere voting, and the 2-party system will be as safe as it is now. You go on later: In other words, IRV can have either of two completely opposite effects, depending on whether a third party is truly competitive or not. Before a third party is competitive, the effect of IRV is equivalent to a plurality system in which all supporters of minor parties are somehow convinced to abandon their principles and vote for the ``lesser of two evils.'' What are you talking about here? Are you suggesting that voting for, eg. Nader#1, Gore#2, is a lessor of two evils vote because I'm voting for Gore over Bush in my #2 vote? I reply: I doubt that that's what Russ meant. The lesser-of-2-evils voting to which Russ was referring is to vote Gore in 1st place so that Nader won't eliminate him and then lose to Bush. That's a risk when Nader is big enough to threaten to eliminate Gore, but not big enough to be a sure winner against Bush. Randy continues: That's exactly what I want to be able to do. No, I suspect you are assuming you've made your case about the #1 rank somehow not coming through, and the #2 rank doesn't either. It's very simple: your #1 lost and your #2 lost. We'll live with it. I reply: And most of us will vote #2 in 1st place to avoid it under those conditions, just as nearly all Nader-preferers did in 2000. Randy's relentless ramble continues: You go on: IRV has other serious problems too, which are explained in more detail elsewhere at the website. It is an erratic voting system because ranking a candidate higher can actually cause the candidate to lose, and ranking a candidate lower can cause the candidate to win. As if that weren't bad enough, it can also fail to elect a candidate who is preferred over each of the other candidates by a majority of the voters. It is also much more difficult to implement with security and integrity because the votes cannot be summed as in most other election methods. You have given no evidence to argue that the higher ranked candidate will lose unfairly, or that a lower ranked candidate will win unfairly. I reply: Randy, IRV's nonmonotonicity is common knowledge to everyone who discusses voting systems. You can easily find examples in voting system literature. Or maybe someone here might look up an example and post it, or write an example. I believe it was Brams who wrote an example in which moving someone from 1st place to last place caused him to win, where he'd have otherwise lost. I'm sorry, Randy, but that isn't acceptable. No doubt you can find IRV nonmonotonicity examples in the EM archives. Randy coninues: It is no more difficult than regular elections to turn in counts that can be summed, and I have demonstrated that in other postings to this mailing list, and will gladly and easily demonstrate it to any who ask. Briefly, all you have to do is turn in counts for each unique set of rankings. Eg. there will be a certain number of L-D-R, L-R-D, R-L-D votes, etc. So the actual number of counts turned in might go up a lot, but are certainly manageable. I reply: Not really, Randy. The number of possible complete rankings varies factorially with the number of candidates. And that's not even counting the number of possible incomplete rankings. Randy continues: I consider IRVs similarities to the current plurality system an advantage -- in the people understand it and will accept it. I reply: IRVies endlessly repeat their unsupported claim that IRV is all that people will understand & accept. I admit that IRV shares Plurality's problems, notably its lesser-of-2-evils problem, due to giving people only 1 vote to put on 1 candidate. But IRV is a completely new voting system that Randy & his Irvie friends are asking people to accept. In comparison, Approval is nothing but Plurality done right. Plurality with the added voter freedom that it should have had all along. Approval is so similar to Plurality that it doesn't even require new ballots. The only change needed is: Where the ballot now says "Vote for 1", it would instead say "Vote for 1 or more". Two new words printed on the ballot. Cost of changing to Approval? Zero. I want to acknowlede that CR, aks Range Voting, is strategically equivalent to Approval, and is already familiar to people, and seems less subject to misunderstanding. Maybe start with CR, and then point out that we get the same benefit more easily with Approval. Randy continues: It also does not have to be the final solution, but will be an improvement over what we already have. I reply: Sure, if you want to make someone win by moving him from 1st choice to last choice, and if you don't want to get rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem. Mike Ossipoff _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
