Adam is certainly the most convincing winning-votes advocate I've seen on the list (and I've never encountered one off-list). I like that he makes his (not unreasonable) assumptions clear. It's hard to imagine a better case for winning-votes, but until there's a better one, I'm still a "margins" fan.
I come from a mathematical background; specifically, I'm a student of game theory. So I tend to be pessimistic: I'd rather assume that whatever voters could do to help themselves, they will do. The argument that any insincere strategy that works under margins also works by flipping a coin under winning-votes is very persuasive to me that winning-votes's advantages are illusory. But I can understand that some wouldn't see flipping a coin as producing the same expected effect as tied votes under margins. In addition, I can't think of any methods besides winning-votes methods for which an optimal zero-information ballot is insincere. Even under plurality, the best vote is sincere in the absence of poll information. I see this as a serious defect of winning-votes, especially in a local or nonpartisan election or if you're not one to trust polls, but again, I can understand that some would disagree. One thing that I never understood about Mike's reasoning (I'm sure Mike will correct me if I'm wrong on any point) is that he likes Approval because it never forces a voter to vote a less-liked candidate over a more-liked candidate, but he likes winning-votes methods because, in a sense, they *do* sometimes force a voter to engage in strategic reversal, where the less radical strategy of voting ties might work under margins. He likes that truncation, voting ties among the lower ranks, isn't a good strategy under winning-votes, but doesn't seem to mind as much that voting effective ties by coin-flipping or outright reversal do the job for a wily voter just as well as truncation. He also doesn't seem worried about top-of-the-ballot "truncation". His aims seem somewhat contradictory to me. It should be remembered that any possible method will have serious strategy problems when the electorate is well-informed and there is no sincere Condorcet winner. Appropriately-formulated polls will show a cycle of frontrunners all the way up to the day of the election. When an election is definitely zero-information, finely-grained Cardinal Ratings is undoubtedly the champ. In fact, when no strategy is possible, I'd rather the sincere CR winner win than the Condorcet winner. The advantage of the Condorcet winner is simply stability under strategy. Given that voters know each other's preferences, CR and Approval both home in on a Condorcet winner, so really they give the best of both worlds. To me, Approval's combination of simplicity and ultimate quality is not only unparalleled, but incredible. Approval-completed Condercet does indeed render the margins/winning-votes debate meaningless. Its only disadvantage in my mind is its slightly more complicated ballot. -- Rob LeGrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.onr.com/user/honky98/rbvote/calc.html __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Greetings - send holiday greetings for Easter, Passover http://greetings.yahoo.com/
