On Mon, 1 Apr 2002 01:04:43 EST [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Adam wrote in part- > > One final thought. on 3/20 I posted a message about Approval Completed > Condorcet. The idea was to use a graded ballot (ABCDEF, for example). If > there was not a Condorcet winner, then the candidate with the most approval > votes (A's, B's, and C's in the case of ABCDEF ballots) wins the > election. In my initial analysis, this method seemed at least as good as > the other Condorcet methods we like to discuss. Furthermore, it seems like > it could be an easier method to pitch, since the cycle-breaker is VERY > intuitive. So I guess what I'm asking is... does ACC render this whole > debate meaningless? Just a thought. > --- > D- I noted ACMA long ago - > > Approval > Concorcet > Most Approved tiebreaker (if no Condorcet winner). > > Approval by itself is defective since it does not rank the Approved choices. > > Condorcet by itself is defective since it does not indicate that a choice is > approved.
I choke on Adam's words for not adequately using the information Condorcet procedures develop; and do not see DEMOREP1 really offering a solution. For example, just picking out the Smith set normally gets a tolerable length list of possible winners. Usually there would be enough differences within the set to make a valid decision. If the best that can be done with Condorcet data leaves a tie, then it matters little what is used as a tie breaker, provided it is reproducible (no human or computer going off in a corner and tossing a coin), so letting Approval pick among what have been identified as the possible winners would be acceptable. -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice.
