> the expense of implementing ranked ballots. Cheapskate! (just ribbing you, Alex, but I am making a point here)
How valuable is a Democratic Republic? How valuable is an Aristocratic Republic (the kind where we chuse, by elections, our "leaders"). I'm the kind of guy who doesn't really care about expense in this matter, and is much more concerned about results. Of course, I think IRV is for the birds... -----Original Message----- From: Alex Small [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Monday, December 30, 2002 11:16 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [EM] 12/30/02 - Alex, Irving still holds the Trump Card: (First, let it be pointed out that Donald has engaged us in debate here by responding to a response. He was criticized for failing to do that.) So, basically, you argue this: In an Approval election, voters will respond to polling information by voting for their favorite of the top 2 plus whomever they prefer to their favorite of the top 2. This is not a stunning insight for us. Brans and Fishburn argued the same more than 2 decades ago. However, I do concede that widespread bullet-voting will not be equivalent to plurality in most cases. See? We agree on something! Anyway, to the extent that Approval is like IRV (I will point out a few key differences momentarily) then Approval basically offers IRV without the expense of implementing ranked ballots. However, I see 3 key differences: 1) The top 2 candidates in a poll may not be the 2 candidates who are the first choices of the greatest number of people, as people can also vote for lower choices. Although the implications of that fact require some amount of work, the conclusions drawn by many workers seem to be that this increases the likelihood of the Condorcet Winner (when such a candidate exists) being in the top 2. The easiest way to illustrate this conclusion is with the classic example 40 Left>Center>Right 11 Center>Left>Right 9 Center>Right>Left 40 Right>Center>Left If enough people on the left and right (for reasons that may be either pity or pragmatism) also indicate support of Center in a poll then he will be one of the top 2 candidates and will most likely win the Approval election. Now, you may claim that the support for Center comes from "Pity Votes", but perhaps it comes from a fear that their least favorite will win. People deciding to do whatever possibility to defeat their least favorite are NOT giving "pity votes." They're giving "Please help me!" votes. In other words, they're acting in their _own_ best interests, not the best interests of a candidate. 2) To continue with the above example, suppose that in an initial poll votes only indicate support for their favorite. Left and Right come out on top. It seems that Left will win after the centrists also give support to their second choice. A second poll will soon bring this out. However, seeing a victory for Left, supporters of Right may decide to support Center as well. They're following a different version of the above assumption: In response to a poll, voters will vote for their favorite of the top 2 as well as all candidates whom they prefer to their favorite, AND POSSIBLY ANY CANDIDATES WHOM THEY RANK BETWEEN THEIR FAVORITE OF THE TOP 2 AND THEIR LEAST FAVORITE OF THE TOP 2. The key is that voters are acting defensively. People on the Right are saying "Well, might as well support Center, because he is better than Left and right now Left is beating Right." This is NOT pity! This is self-defense. It's difficult to gauge how likely the phenomena in points 1 and 2 are. However, they are very real possibilities. They cannot be predicted from principles, but they can occur in response to the will of the electorate. Finally... 3) Consider a true 3-way race, in which a poll gives 3 candidates levels of support that differ by less than the statistical margin of error. Here it is difficult to predict what will happen. Most people here argue that voters will act to maximize their expected utility in the face of a true 3-way race. If that indeed is true then the winner will be the candidate with the greatest overall social utility. Not a bad result, and certainly not a "pity" result. It's also hard to predict the outcome of an IRV election when 3 candidates have roughly equal levels of first-place support in polls (obviously the outcome can be determined from actual ballots, but I'm talking about polls, which have margins of error). A candidate's first instinct would be to seek more first-place support. However, if he draws too much first-place support from the only candidate whom he can beat pairwise then it will backfire, and he'll wind up in a race against somebody whom he can't beat. So, he must decide very carefully where to try and poach more support. By contrast, in a true 3-way race with Approval, it doesn't matter where a candidate draws more support from in a campaign. It only matters that he gets more votes. In that sense, Approval makes campaign strategy more straight-forward than IRV, since Approval says "Persuade more people that you deserve a vote" (merit, not pity) while IRV says "Be careful not to draw so much support that you knock out the person whom you can beat." So, in summary: 1) In many cases IRV and Approval will function in the same manner. In those cases, Approval offers IRV without the added expense of new voting machines. 2) When lower choices play a significant role in an Approval election it's because voters are defending their own interests. They are supporting any and all candidates whom they prefer to a likely winner. Those votes for lower choices are based on an assessment of relative merit, not "pity". 3) In a true 3-way contest, Approval offers more transparency for candidates and voters. The consequence of seeking more support from a faction is more support, not the possibility of knocking out a soft rival. Likewise, the consequence of voting for a candidate is that he receives more votes, not that he will a "soft target" has been eliminated. Seen in this light, Approval offers voters a way to defend their best interests in a rational manner. Pity plays no role here. Alex ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ This message is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the designated recipient(s) named above. If you are not the intended recipient of this message you are hereby notified that any review, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. This communication is for information purposes only and should not be regarded as an offer to sell or as a solicitation of an offer to buy any financial product, an official confirmation of any transaction, or as an official statement of Lehman Brothers. Email transmission cannot be guaranteed to be secure or error-free. Therefore, we do not represent that this information is complete or accurate and it should not be relied upon as such. All information is subject to change without notice. ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
