At 06:47 PM 10/12/2005, James Gilmour wrote: > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, October > 12, 2005 2:04 PM > > > > But all it proves is that sometimes it can happen > > that Droop quota leads to a more proportional result than Hare quota. > >The fact that it happens at all shows that the use of the Hare quota >is flawed. > > > Although I haven't yet finished my analysis, my actual > > feeling is that Hare would usually lead to a more > > proportional result. > >This statement makes no sense to me, especially in view of the >result illustrated.
It is possible, with Asset Voting, to approach the Hare quota, and even to exactly meet it, and, under Asset, presuming a winner with the Droop quota could result in less than the ideal proportional representation. It would depend on the specific rules and context. Certainly the logic behind the Droop quota is good. Under Asset Voting, excess votes would be distributed by those holding them (rather than by ranked assignments by the voters, though ranked assignments might be used in addition, with priority to the ranked assignments until they were exhausted). The distributions would be, I would assume redistributable, so elections would be exact, down to the fraction of a vote. I've assumed that these elections would be meeting the Hare quota. If not, if the Droop quota is used, there would be excess votes. Who would represent those voters? On the other hand, if the Hare quota is used, there could remain a set of intransigent candidates. My assumption has been that intransigent candidates would lead to empty seats. However, there could be other ways of dealing with the situation. The harm would be small if there were a few representatives with less than the full quota. It means that the representatives would have voting power in excess of that justified by the votes, but the gain in (very small) minority representation could be worth that small and largely inconsequential inequity. I might be appropriate for the rules to allow election by the Droop quota for the last N representatives. Most observers considering this question are approaching Proportional Representation from the opposite side than I. Compared to single-winner district representation, PR is a vast advance, and results in many fewer wasted votes. However, compared to delegable proxy, where *no* votes are wasted, PR is complex. The complexity comes from the attempt to create a peer assembly, with equal voting power of the representatives, instead of the norm in corporate governance, voting power which varies with the number of proxies held. I think the goal of a peer assembly is good. One possible compromise would be to elect a peer assembly, with the equal voting power, to the extent possible, and then allow a few representatives with fractional voting power. This could approach the complete equity of delegable proxy so closely that the difference would minimal. Right now, assemblies are peer, but at a cost of a great number of wasted votes; this effect is severe in single-winner district representation, greatly ameliorated with multi-winner PR single-stage election methods, almost entirely eliminated with Asset Voting (which is really a multi-stage election method, it does not produce complete results solely from the votes cast), and totally eliminated with proxy or delegable proxy. (Delegable proxy is recommended because it allows proxy selection on a small scale, where the voters can personally know the proxies, while collecting representation on a much larger scale. Otherwise standard, single proxy would be adequate. It's my opinion that delegable proxy would strongly reform corporate governance.) ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
